This completed the infantry deployment. Company H had its three platoons spread over 1,500 yards, while those of Company G ranged at least an equal distance. Due to the lack of a third company, Taplett had no reserve other than a handful of headquarters troops. Thus 3/5 got its taste of things to come in a strange war of mountains and men. As the riflemen were digging their hilltop holes with traditional distaste, other supporting elements of the Brigade and 5th Marines began to arrive at Chindong-ni and set up for business. These included the Brigade Reconnaissance Company and a platoon of the regimental 4.2-inch Mortar Company.[176] All Marine units in the area temporarily came under control of 3/5’s Battalion Commander. Taplett was given the added responsibility of handling all area requests for tactical air support.[177] [176] Annex How. [177] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv with authors, 20 Apr 54 (Taplett, 20 Apr 54). For the time being, the 3d Battalion itself was under operational control of Colonel John H. Michaelis, USA, commander of the 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds.” Verbal instructions from Major General Kean on 6 August had given the Army officer control of all troops in the Chindong-ni area. When a second Marine battalion arrived in the locale, command would then pass to General Craig.[178] [178] Brig SAR, basic rpt. By 1600, Taplett had reported his command post location and defensive positions to Michaelis. Immediately afterwards he ordered mortars and artillery to lay registration fires on the northern approaches to Chindong-ni.[179] Having left the phantoms of Changwon far behind, the Marines of the reinforced battalion settled down for the night. [179] _Ibid._; and Annex How. _First Platoon Fight_ Shortly after midnight, the 3d Battalion received an unexpected message which precipitated the first Marine infantry action of the war. Colonel Michaelis radioed Taplett and passed on a directive from 25th Division, ordering the Marine battalion to commit immediately one reinforced platoon for the defense of Hill 342. He explained that this unit was to relieve a beleaguered Army company being slowly eaten away in a private war of attrition. Taplett informed the regimental commander that he could ill afford to spare 1 of his 6 rifle platoons, but was told in return that General Kean had ordered 342 held at all costs.[180] [180] This section of the narrative is derived from: LtCol R. D. Taplett interv with the author, 18 Nov 53 and 19 May 54; Annexes Easy and How to Brig SAR; and Capt J. H. Cahill ltr to authors, 9 Dec 53.