Lieutenant Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had been ordered to move forward from Chindong-ni at 0600, 8 August, with the mission of attacking along the south fork of the Tosan junction preparatory to seizing a regimental objective which would be designated later.[234] [234] Annex How; Brig Op Plan 5-50; and Col G. R. Newton, ltr to author, 3 Jan 54 (Newton, 3 Jan 54). Leaving its positions on Hill 99 at the assigned time, the battalion was stalled immediately at the bridges on the MSR below. The road was still clogged with soldiers and Army vehicles, making it impossible for the Marine unit to proceed.[235] [235] LtCol M. R. Olson, interv with author, 30 Dec 53 (Olson, 30 Dec 53). General Craig, who was in the vicinity, told Newton to hold up until the situation at the front became clarified. Company B, commanded by Captain John L. Tobin, was ordered back up on the hill it had just descended; and the battalion waited, three miles from its line of departure.[236] [236] Col G. R. Newton, ltr to author, 19 Jan 54 (Newton, 19 Jan 54). Finally the word came to move up. While 1/5 worked its way along the crowded road, Newton walked ahead and reached the CP of the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, located on a hillside between Singi and Oryong. There he learned that the Army unit’s companies were already on the high ground all around the junction and that the rice paddies between the battalion CP and these companies were full of North Koreans. The Army commander considered his subordinate units cut off.[237] [237] Newton, 3 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53. Shortly afterwards, at about 1400, the head of 1/5’s column reached Newton and again came to a halt, a mile and a half from its line of departure. Arriving on the scene at this time was a dispirited Army staff sergeant, dripping with mud and water. He said that he had just returned from Hill 308, south of the road junction, where his unit was heavily engaged with the enemy. And he added that Communist machineguns covering the wide rice paddy between 308 and the MSR had forced him to crawl almost the whole distance.[238] [238] Olson, 30 Dec 53. Lieutenant Colonel Murray, while driving from Chindong-ni to the front, was stopped on the road by Major General Kean himself. The 25th Division commander directed the Marine officer to arrange for a night relief of the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT. Kean stated that he would inform Brigade headquarters of this change in plans as soon as possible.[239] [239] Col R. L. Murray, ltr to author, 7 Jan 54 (Murray, 7 Jan 54). It had become a question as to whether Task Force Kean or the NKPA 6th Division controlled Tosan. Newton radioed the 5th Marines commander and asked for enlightenment. Murray, having just finished his conversation with General Kean, ordered the battalion commander to postpone the jumpoff until nightfall.[240] [240] Newton, 3 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53.