U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Action on the Division’s southern flank involved little more than hill
climbing and foot races for the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and the
Division Reconnaissance Company. After jumping off in the morning of
D-plus 2, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’ infantry fanned out through a
maze of twisting valleys and ridges. The battalion encountered only
light resistance, which invariably evaporated under pressure, and
by dark the assault elements had gained 4,000 yards. Hawkins then
deployed his troops for night defense on the high ground south of 3/1’s
positions overlooking the highway defile.[272]
[272] McGee-Carlon interv, 9 Feb 55.
On the right of the 1st Battalion, Captain Houghton’s Reconnaissance
Company reached the tip of the Namdong Peninsula. The Recon troops
spent two days, the 17th and 18th, patrolling this spacious tactical
vacuum. A number of dispirited prisoners were collected and caches of
arms and munitions uncovered. One of the more significant discoveries
was a small arsenal in which Russian-type wooden box mines were being
manufactured and stored in quantity. First encountered by Able Company
engineers in the Pusan Perimeter, these crude but effective explosives
would become serious obstacles to the Marine advance in the days
ahead.[273]
[273] HqBn, 1st MarDiv _Unit Rpts_, 9 Sep-11 Nov 50; and
Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54. See also this series, I:225.
The night of 17–18 September passed quietly for the 1st Marines. During
the hours of darkness, Ridge requested intermittent naval gunfire to
interdict Sosa and Hill 123, where he believed enemy defenses to be
located. Jump-off fires were also planned for the morning in addition
to air strikes. Captain P. W. Brock’s HMS _Kenya_ poured in more than
300 6-inch rounds with good results. “Our Royal Navy ally not only
supported the battalion to the maximum of its naval gunfire desires,”
said Ridge, “but volunteered to render more than was requested.”[274]
[274] Ridge memo, 13 May 55.
Shortly after first light on D-plus 3, the 2d Battalion attacked along
the highway with Easy Company on the left of the road and Dog on the
right. Premature air bursts from an artillery preparation resulted in
two KIA and three WIA among the troops of Company E.[275]
[275] 2/1 _SAR_, 6; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54; Carter ltr, 9
May 55.
Ridge’s 3d Battalion boarded a column of LVTs, DUKWs, and jeeps, then
rumbled down the highway through 2/1’s assault companies. In striking
contrast to the previous day’s advance, there was a conspicuous absence
of NKPA infantry along the way. The Marines brushed aside light
opposition, including an antitank roadblock at Sosa’s outskirts, and
captured the town at noon. Covered by Baker Company Tanks, 2/1 moved
into defensive positions on the right side of the railroad about a mile
beyond the built-up area, and the 3d Battalion deployed on Hill 123
just across the tracks.[276]
[276] _Ibid._; and 3/1 _SAR_, 7.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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