---------------------------+--------+----------+--------+------ [a] Carried in other Brigade, Division, or Force units. [b] Additional duty basis; not counted in total.[86] [86] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 54–55. The Marine planners aboard the _Mount McKinley_ were short on elbow room as well as personnel, time, and equipment. Although it was an advantage to have the planning groups of the Attack Force and Landing Force together, the ship did not provide enough space for both without crowding. Moreover, the already undermanned Marine contingent had to be further reduced late in August by sending several officers to Kobe to meet incoming units. Thus the G-2 section, to cite one example, consisted of only two officers, one of whom was detached on this duty for a week. “The issuance of and adherence to a planning schedule was utterly impossible,” commented the 1st Marine Division report. “Only by a virtual ‘around the clock’ working day, concurrent ... planning by Attack Force (ComPhibGru One) and Landing Force (1st MarDiv), willing teamwork by both, and especially the amphibious ‘know-how’ of key staff members gained by long experience, was it possible to complete and issue ... plans and orders for a most difficult ... landing operation. The time-space factor denied any coordinated orientation, prohibited even the most elementary rehearsal, made it difficult to distribute orders, and gave subordinate units very little time for formulation and distribution of their plans.”[87] [87] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, basic rpt. Command relationships during the embarkation and assault phases were as follows: +------+ +-----------+CinCFE+-------------+ | +------+ | +---+----+ +----+-----+ +----+ComNavFe+--------+ |CG X Corps| | +--------+ | +----------+ | | +------+-------+ +------+------+ |ComPhibGru One| |CG 1st MarDiv| +--------------+ +-------------+ All the top commanders were concentrated in Tokyo with the arrival of Admiral Struble on 25 August. This facilitated the planning and allowed important decisions to be worked out in conferences between the principal commanders.[88] [88] Struble ltr, 25 Apr 55. Planning was based mainly on studies made by ComPhibGru One as prospective Attack Force Commander. It was conducted entirely on a concurrent basis by the Attack Force and Landing Force groups aboard the _Mount McKinley_. No step was taken by either without the full knowledge and consent of the other. _X Corps Scheme of Maneuver_