U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
On 4 November, while RCT-7 was at the height of its fight with the
Chinese, the Division CP displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam. General
Craig, the ADC, who inspected the area on the 2d, recommended the
abandoned Engineering College on the western outskirts as the best
location. During his visit he was shown a knoll outside the city where
the bodies of some 200 Korean civilians were laid out in a perfect row.
All had been victims of the retreating NKPA forces.[304]
[304] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr, 20 Feb 56.
A location in Hamhung would have been preferred, but available sites
were already taken by X Corps. General Smith flew to Hungnam by
helicopter and opened the new CP at 1100 on the morning of the 4th.
That evening a train carrying 160 officers and men of Headquarters
Battalion and the Division staff arrived at 2130 from Wonsan. En route
it had been fired on by guerrillas but no casualties resulted.[305]
[305] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514; CG 1stMarDiv
msg to Subordinate Units, 2200 3 Nov 50; MajGen E. W.
Snedeker Comments, 4 May 56.
A perimeter defense, consisting of two outposts and eight machine-gun
positions, was set up to command all likely approaches to the new CP.
Defensive wiring and trip flares were installed, with the gun positions
and outposts being connected by telephone.
During these proceedings everyone was blissfully unaware of the
existence of 250 tons of NKPA high explosive, stored only 600 yards
from the CP in three connecting caves. Undiscovered for a week, this
enemy cache was believed capable of demolishing the command post. A
16-man security detachment was placed on guard until the explosive
could be removed and detonated.[306]
[306] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514. Some
explosive, too unstable to be moved, was left in the
caves. Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56.
_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR_
Protection of the Wonsan-Hungnam MSR took on added importance as
the 1st Marine Division speeded up its move to the north. This
responsibility, it may be recalled, was shared by Division and Corps
on 3 November in accordance with a decision by General Almond. The 1st
Marines and elements of the 1st Tank Battalion maintained security
from Wonsan 15 miles northward to Munchon, while the 1st Battalion of
the 5th Marines was responsible from Hamhung southward to Chigyong.
This left the 54-mile stretch between Chigyong and Munchon without any
protection except the patrols of the Korean CIC agents and the Special
Operations Company, USA, both under Corps control.
On 4 November this company reported that large numbers of North Koreans
were moving into the area to the west. That same afternoon Corps
notified Division that a group of mounted guerrillas had fired on
railway police in the yards at Kowon, 15 miles north of Munchon.[307]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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