U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Weapons Company, on the far side of the depression, held its ground,
but H&S, directly under the gun, shortly fell back across the MSR.
Taplett’s CP was left in a no man’s land, with enemy bullets raining
down out of the night and Marine fire whistling back from across the
draw and road. Upon learning of the withdrawal, the battalion commander
elected to remain in the tent in order to keep telephone contact with
his rifle companies, which were as yet uninvolved. He did not consider
the situation too serious, and it seemed as though the police platoon’s
machine guns had taken the sting out of the enemy assault.
Except for a few individuals, the Chinese did not descend from the
spur. Nor did they direct much fire at Taplett’s blackout tent, which
they probably took to be unoccupied. Inside, the battalion commander
studied his maps, received reports and issued instructions over the
field phone while his S-3, Major Thomas A. Durham, sat nearby with
pistol drawn. Major John J. Canney, the executive officer, left the
CP to retrieve H&S Company and was killed as he approached the MSR.
Private First Class Louis W. Swinson, radio operator, whose instrument
had proved unreliable in the severe cold, took position outside
the tent and covered the approaches with his rifle. This unique
situation--a battalion commander under fire in an exposed position
while his rifle companies lay peacefully entrenched several hundred
yards away--lasted for over an hour.
_The Battle of North Ridge_
At approximately 0300, when Taplett, Durham, and Swinson began their
lonely vigil, the 79th CCF Division launched another assault on North
Ridge (see Map 16).[393] As a result of the enemy’s first attack,
and in anticipation of the second, Colonel Murray earlier had moved
elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, into position behind 3/5.
[393] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from:
1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 1/5 _HD, Nov 50_; 7thMar _SAR_, 21;
7thMar _URpt 5_; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28
Nov 50; Murray Comments; Hull Comments; Cdr J. H. Craven
Comments, 24 Aug 56; Maj W. E. Kerrigan ltr, 7 Sep 56;
Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun
56; 1stLt R. E. Snyder Comments, 15 Sep 56.
Second Lieutenant Nicholas M. Trapnell’s 1st Platoon of Company A
left the battalion assembly area in the valley at 0100 and started up
the steep incline of Hill 1282. Climbing the icy slopes by day was
difficult enough, but darkness and a minus-20-degree temperature made
it a gruelling and perilous ordeal. Trapnell’s outfit did not reach the
crest until after 0300, when the CCF assault was at the height of its
fury and Company E was facing imminent annihilation. The Able Company
unit moved into position with Lieutenant Bey’s platoon on the spur
jutting back from the peak. As yet, the full force of the Chinese drive
had not spread to this area.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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