U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
It was typical of the informality attending this operation that a
Marine NCO with a small group attached themselves to Jochums, giving
him a total of about 45. They had an exhausting, 45-minute climb up the
hill to the line of departure, where Myers directed them to attack on
the left of his main force.
The early morning fog enshrouded East Hill and Myers’ attack had to
wait until it cleared. The jump-off line lay along a steep slope with
little or no cover. From the outset the advancing troops were exposed
to scattered small-arms fire as well as grenades which needed only
to be rolled downhill. New snow covering the old icy crust made for
treacherous footing, so that the heavily laden men took painful falls.
Myers’ little task force can scarcely be considered a tactical
organization. His close air support was excellent; but both artillery
and mortar support were lacking. Jochums did not notice any weapons
save small arms and grenades.
“Our plane assaults were very effective, especially the napalm
attacks,” he commented on the basis of a personal log kept at the time.
“During these strikes, either live or dry runs, the enemy troops in the
line of fire would often rise and run from their positions to those in
the rear.”[456]
[456] Capt R. E. Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Myers Comments.
Marine air came on station at 0930 as VMF-312 planes peeled off to hit
the enemy with napalm and bombs. The squadron flew 31 sorties that
day at Hagaru, nearly all in the East Hill area. Enemy small-arms
fire crippled one aircraft; but the pilot, First Lieutenant Harry W.
Colmery, escaped serious injuries by making a successful crash landing
within the perimeter.[457]
[457] VMF-312 _SAR_, 15–16.
All accounts agree that the ground forces met more serious opposition
from the terrain at times than from the enemy. So cut up into ridges
and ravines was this great hill mass that the troops seldom knew
whether they were advancing in defilade or exposing themselves to
the fire of hidden adversaries. Thus the attack became a lethal game
of hide-and-seek in which a step to the right or left might make the
difference between life and death. On the other hand, when the Corsairs
provided shooting gallery targets by flushing out opponents, only a
few men could get into effective firing position along the narrow,
restricted ridges before the Communists scuttled safely to new cover.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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