U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
[471] Maj McLaughlin was one of the TTU instructors who had
transferred to the X Corps Staff. He was an Assistant G-3
and Corps liaison officer with 1stMarDiv.
The three smaller perimeters appear to have resulted from the
splintering of a larger group originally containing nearly all the men
caught south of the second cut in the convoy. Major Henry J. Seeley,
Division motor transport officer, attempted to form a perimeter with
these men but was frustrated by Chinese attacks which forced the men
to fall back in small groups. About 300 yards south of McLaughlin’s
perimeter the remnants of two Army platoons crouched in a drainage
ditch. Apparently several Marines, including CWO Dee R. Yancey, were
with them. Some 30 yards farther down the ditch were Captain Michael
J. Capraro, the Division PIO, First Lieutenant John A. Buck, General
Craig’s aide, and about 15 headquarters troops. A few other Marines
clustered around Major Seeley, perhaps a hundred yards south of
Capraro’s group.[472]
[472] Distances are approximate, since it is understandable
that estimates made by participants in the darkness
varied a great deal.
There was some hope at first that the tanks of Baker Company, 1st Tank
Battalion, would come to the rescue. But the Marine armor ran into
heavy opposition near Hills 1236 and 1182 along the road cleared only a
few hours before by Task Force Drysdale.
When attacking a convoy, the Chinese usually strove to split the
motorized column into segments suitable for tactical mastication. That
is what happened to Baker Company. The tanks and trucks nearest to
Koto-ri got back without much trouble at 2110 after the enemy cut the
column into three groups. The middle group, comprising most of the
service trucks, was hit hardest. Lieutenant Colonel Harvey S. Walseth,
the Division G-1, was wounded as this group finally fought back to
Koto-ri at 0230 after heavy losses in trucks. This left the tank
platoon which had proceeded farthest; and it formed a tight perimeter
for the night about half a mile south of Seeley’s position, boxed in by
friendly artillery fires from Koto-ri. At dawn the tanks returned to
Koto-ri without further enemy interference.
No knowledge of these events reached the beleaguered troops in Hell
Fire Valley. They continued to hope that the tanks might arrive to the
aid of men who had no weapons larger than a single 75mm recoilless in
addition to rifles, carbines, and grenades. There were also a few 60mm
mortars but no ammunition for them.
Fortunately, no determined Chinese attacks were received up to
midnight. Looting the trucks proved more alluring than fighting to the
Asiatics, and their officers contented themselves with keeping the
perimeters pinned down and enveloped on three sides.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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