U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Almond directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan and time schedule
for extricating the Army battalions east of the Reservoir. Those
two generals agreed, however, that not much could be done until the
Yudam-ni Marines arrived at Hagaru, and the conference ended on an
inconclusive note. That same afternoon X Corps OpnO 8-50 was received.
It defined the Corps mission as “maintaining contact with the enemy to
the maximum capability consistent with cohesive action, oriented to the
Hamhung-Hungnam base of operation.”[481]
[481] X Corps _OpnO 8_, 30 Nov 50. See also X Corps _WD Sum,
Nov 50_, 16–17; and CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_
30 Nov 50.
The decision to concentrate X Corps forces in that area meant the
evacuation of Wonsan. General Harris lost no time in directing MAG-12
to move from Wonsan Airfield to Yonpo. Hedron-12 and the three combat
squadrons began shifting personnel and equipment at once. Transfer of
the aircraft was completed on 1 December. In many instances the planes
took off on combat missions from Wonsan and landed at Yonpo, so that
the ground forces were not deprived of air support.[482]
[482] MAG-12 _HD Nov 50_, 8; 1stMAW _HD Dec 50_; CO MAG-12 msg
to Movement Report Office (MRO) Tokyo, 0805 2 Dec 50 in
_ibid._ VMF-312 _HD, Dec 50_.
High level naval commanders were already preparing for an evacuation
of northeast Korea if matters came to the worst. Admiral Joy foresaw
as early as the 28th that if the retreat of the battered Eighth Army
continued, X Corps would have to choose between falling back and
being outflanked. In view of the time needed to collect the enormous
quantities of shipping required, he warned Admiral Doyle on that date
that a large-scale redeployment operation might be necessary. Doyle in
turn directed his staff to commence planning for redeployment either by
an administrative outloading or by a fighting withdrawal.[483]
[483] ComPhibGruOne, _Action Report for Hungnam Redeployment,
December 1950_, 1.
_CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru_
During the early hours of darkness on 30 November, it appeared that
Hagaru might have a second quiet night. Three bugle calls were heard
by Item Company at 2015, and the enemy sent up a green flare an hour
later. But no unusual CCF activity was reported until 2330, when small
patrols began probing for weak spots in the Item Company lines.
The enemy could scarcely have chosen a less rewarding area for such
research. As usual, Lieutenant Fisher had built up an elaborate system
of concertinas, trip flares, and booby traps; and his sandbagged
foxholes and weapon emplacements afforded his men maximum protection.
At midnight, when the enemy came on in strength, each successive
assault wave shattered against the terrific fire power which a Marine
rifle company, aided by artillery, tanks, 81mm mortars, and heavy
machine guns, could concentrate.
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