U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
A comparatively few men, giving way to panic, were endangering the
entire column. Behind one of the fleeing trucks an angry warrant
officer pounded in pursuit, shouting some of the most sulphurous
profanity that Lieutenant Colonel Taplett had ever heard.[534] This
was CWO Allen Carlson of Baker Battery, 1/11. He disappeared around a
bend in the road, only to return a moment later with a chastened driver
towing a 105mm howitzer. Carlson hastily recruited a crew and set up
the piece beside the road for point-blank fire at the enemy position
while Taplett directed the fire of a 75mm recoilless rifle.
[534] Taplett interv, 8 Jun 56.
A Charlie Battery howitzer and a 1/5 heavy machine gun added their
contribution as a platoon of Easy Company, 2/5, attacked under cover of
air strikes. The Chinese position was overrun at 0830 at an estimated
cost to the enemy of 150 dead. Two other attacks were launched by
infantry units of Roise’s battalion on the high ground to the left
before the MSR was cleared.
When the 155mm howitzers were pushed off the road, it had been assumed
that they would be retrieved. Only 1000 yards farther down the MSR
was a cache of air-dropped diesel fuel, but efforts to bring back
replenishments were frustrated by enemy fire. Attempts at recovery by
the British Marines failed later that day, and orders were given for
the destruction by air of the eight stalled howitzers plus a ninth
which had previously been abandoned after skidding off the road. This
was the largest loss of weapons in the Yudam-ni breakout.
At 1400 on 4 December the last elements of the rearguard, 3/7, entered
the perimeter and the four-day operation passed into history. Some
1500 casualties were brought to Hagaru, a third of them being in the
non-battle category, chiefly frostbite cases. It had taken the head of
the column about 59 hours to cover the 14 miles, and the rear units 79
hours.
“Under the circumstances of its execution,” commented General Smith,
“the breakout was remarkably well conducted. Since centralized control
of the widespread elements was a difficult task, particularly with a
joint command, unit commanders were required to exercise a high degree
of initiative.... The spirit and discipline of the men under the most
adverse conditions of weather and terrain was another highly important
factor contributing to the success of the operation and also reflecting
the quality of the leadership being exercised.”[535]
[535] Smith, _Notes_, 948.
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 5679
]
_This Was Hagaru--Two views of the Marine forward base
at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, with East Hill in
the background; here the troops reorganized for the final
breakout._
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4971
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 5434
]
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