A serious handicap to planning was the shortage of staff personnel. This was due in part to the casualties suffered by the last convoy of Headquarters troops to move up from Hungnam. Moreover, the office force had been depleted by calls for reinforcements to defend the perimeter. By dint of working round the clock, however, planning for the breakout to Koto-ri was completed on schedule. OpnO 25-50, issued at 0800 on 5 December, provided for an advance of the 1st Marine Division at first light the following morning on the Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni-Majon-dong axis to close the Hamhung area. The principal subordinate units were assigned these tasks: (a) RCT-5 (3/1 attached) to relieve all elements on perimeter defense in the Hagaru area by 1200, 5 December; to cover the movement of RCT-7 out of Hagaru to the south; to follow RCT-7 to the south on the Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis; to protect the Division rear from Hagaru to Koto-ri; and to follow RCT-7 from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area as Division reserve. (b) RCT-7 to advance south at first light on 6 December on the Hagaru-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis to close the Hamhung area. (c) RCT-1 (-) to continue to hold Koto-ri and Chanhung-ni, protecting the approach and passage of the remainder of the Division through Koto-ri; and to protect the Division rear from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area.[551] [551] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 25-50_, 5 Dec 50. Other sources for the remainder of this section are: 1stMarDiv _AdmO 20-50_, 4 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv Destruction Plan, Hagaru Area, 4 Dec 50; Smith, _Chronicle_, 104–106. All personnel except drivers, relief drivers, radio operators, casualties and men specially designated by RCT commanders, were to march on foot alongside motor serials to provide close-in security. It was directed that vehicles breaking down should be pushed to the side of the road and destroyed if not operative by the time the column passed. During halts a perimeter defense of motor serials was to be established. Nine control points were designated by map references to be used for reporting progress of the advance or directing air drops. Demolitions to clear obstacles from the front and to create them to the rear were planned by the Division Engineer Officer. Division AdminO 20-50, which accompanied OpnO 25-50, prescribed that the troops were to take enough “C” rations for two days, equally distributed between individual and organic transportation. Selected items of “B” rations were to be loaded on organic vehicles, and the following provision was made for ammunition: On individual, up to 1 U/F per individual weapon; on vehicle, minimum 1 U/F, then proportionate share per RCT until dumps depleted or transportation capacity exceeded.