U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Continuous artillery support, both for RCT-5 and RCT-7, was planned
by the 11th Marines. Two batteries of the 3d Battalion and one of the
4th were to move out at the head of the RCT-7 train, the two from 3/11
to occupy initial positions halfway to Koto-ri to support the attack
southward to that objective, and the 4/11 battery to take position in
Koto-ri and provide general support northward in combination with the
battery of 2/11 attached to that perimeter. The remaining batteries of
the 3d and 4th Battalions would provide initial support from Hagaru
southward until ordered to move out.
The three batteries of 1/11, with D/11 attached, were to support the
operations of RCT-5 in a similar manner. Two batteries would move out
at the head of the regimental train to positions halfway to Koto-ri,
the remaining two would fire to the south in support of withdrawing
units and then displace when the first two were in position.[555]
[555] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS (hereafter 11Mar _SAR_), 8. As
a consequence of the loss of nine 155mm howitzers during
the last night of the Yudam-ni-Hagaru breakout, 4/11 was
reorganized into two firing batteries of four howitzers
each.
Throughout the night of 5–6 December, the darkness was stabbed by
flashes as the artillery at Hagaru fired concentrations to saturate
the area along the Hagaru-Koto-ri axis. In order to prevent cratering
of the road the 155’s fired VT rounds. A secondary purpose of this
bombardment was to expend profitably the surplus of ammunition which
could not be brought out.[556]
[556] _Ibid._, 1stMarDiv _POR_ 209, 6 Dec 50; LtCol W.
McReynolds Comments, 16 Aug 56.
At daybreak on the 6th the Division Headquarters broke camp. General
Smith had decided to fly the command group to Koto-ri in advance of
the troops, so that planning could begin immediately for the breakout
from Koto-ri southward. General Barr visited during the morning and
was informed that the 7th Infantry Division casualties who had reached
Hagaru had been flown out. The remaining 490 able-bodied men (including
385 survivors of Task Force Faith) had been provided with Marine
equipment and organized into a provisional battalion under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, USA. This battalion was attached to the
7th Marines and sometimes referred to as 31/7.
Throughout the morning General Smith kept in close touch with the
progress of RCT-7 toward Koto-ri. At 1400 a reassuring message was
received from Colonel Litzenberg, and the commanding general took off
from Hagaru by helicopter. Ten minutes later he and his aide, Captain
Martin J. Sexton, landed at Koto-ri. The other members of the command
group, following by OY and helicopter, set up in a large tent at
Koto-ri and started planning for the next stage.[557]
[557] Smith, _Notes_, 1058–1060; HqBn, _HD, Dec 50_, 5.
_East Hill Retaken from Chinese_
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