Thus the first stage of the Division breakout came to a close. In proportion to total numbers, the service troops of Division Train No. 1 had taken the heaviest losses--six killed and 12 wounded for the Division Headquarters Company; one killed and 16 wounded for the Military Police Company; four killed and 28 wounded for the 1st Motor Transport Battalion; one killed and 27 wounded for the 1st Ordnance Battalion; and three killed and 34 wounded for the 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines. Battle casualties for the entire 1st Marine Division, including those of the East Hill battle, were as follows: ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------- Dates | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Totals ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------- 6 Dec | 32 | 4 | 7 | 218 | 261 7 Dec | 51 | 16 | 0 | 288 | 355 ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------- Totals | 83 | 20 | 7 | 506 | 616[573] ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------- [573] Div Adjutant _SAR_, Appendix II, 3. About 38 hours were required for the movement of some 10,000 troops and more than 1,000 vehicles. The new arrivals filled the perimeter at Koto-ri to the bursting point, but there was to be no pause at this point. Division OpnO 26-50, issued at 1815 on the 7th, before the last troops had arrived, provided for the advance to be resumed from Koto-ri at first light the following morning. CHAPTER XIV Onward from Koto-ri _Assembly of Division at Koto-ri--Activation of Task Force Dog--Air Drop of Bridge Sections--Division Planning for Attack--Battle of 1/1 in the Snowstorm--Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5--Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December--Completion of Division Breakout_ The progress of the 1st Marine Division breakout depended in no small degree on the reliable communications provided by the division radio relay linking up Hagaru, Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni, and Hungnam. At 1440 on 6 December the vehicles of the Hagaru relay terminal joined Division Train No. 1, whereupon the station at Koto-ri became in turn the terminal.[574] [574] Smith, _Notes_, 1056. This station was located on the highest point of ground just south of the Koto-ri perimeter. And though it was outside the defense area, the Chinese did not bother it until the Marines were breaking camp. Then the opposition consisted only of harassing small-arms fires instead of the attack which might have been expected.[575] [575] Col A. Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56; Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56.