U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
At 2115 on 6 December the 1st Marine Division requested by dispatch
that the relief be completed the next day in order to free 1/1 for
the attack to the north. The relief column, designated Task Force Dog
and commanded by Brigadier General Armistead D. Mead, ADC of the 3d
Infantry Division, consisted of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, the
92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, plus detachments of engineers,
signalmen, and antiaircraft troops. Brushing aside some Chinese
roadblocks, it arrived at Chinhung-ni on the afternoon of the 7th and
relieved 1/1 immediately.[584]
[584] Smith, _Notes_, 1063–1064; X Corps _Special Report,
Chosin Reservoir_, 20–24; X Corps _OI 26_, 5 Dec 50;
and Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 90; CG
1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 2115 6 Dec 50; CG X Corps
msg X 13811, 7 Dec 50; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.
_Air Drop of Bridge Sections_
Another problem which the 1st Marine Division planners had faced at
Hagaru called for an engineering solution. As early as 4 December the
commanding general was notified that a critical bridge three and a
half miles south of Koto-ri (see Map 29) had been blown by the enemy
for the third time. At this point water from the Chosin Reservoir was
discharged from a tunnel into four penstocks, or large steel pipes,
which descended sharply down the mountainside to the turbines of the
power plant in the valley below. Where the pipes crossed the road, they
were covered on the uphill side by a concrete gatehouse, without a
floor. On the downhill side was the one-way bridge over the penstocks
which the enemy had thrice destroyed. Between the cliff and the sheer
drop down the mountainside there was no possibility of a bypass. Thus
the gap of 16 feet (24 feet, counting the abutments) must be spanned if
the Division was to bring out its vehicles, tanks and guns.[585]
[585] Except when otherwise specified, this section is based
on the following sources: Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51,
48–63; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 15 Jul 51, 72–73;
Smith, _Notes_, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1109; 1stEngBn
_SAR_, 3–14; Geer, _The New Breed_, 361–362, 369; LtCol
J. H. Partridge Comments, n. d.
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