U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The planners had realized that the success of the movement to
Chinhung-ni would depend to a large extent on the seizure of Objective
E--Hill 1081. On 2 December Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck had led a
reconnaissance patrol into Funchilin Pass as far north as this
position. Sighting large numbers of Chinese on both sides of the road,
he called for artillery fires with good effect. This reconnaissance did
much to establish Hill 1081 as the key terrain feature.
Although 1/1 had patrolled aggressively, the battalion had engaged in
no large-scale actions so far in the Reservoir campaign. The men were
fresh, well-rested and spoiling for a fight when they moved out at 0200
on 8 December from an assembly area south of Chinhung-ni after being
relieved by Task Force Dog.
Schmuck’s battle plan provided for the three companies to advance in
column along the MSR in the predawn darkness. Since orders were to
attack at 0800, a start at 0200 was considered necessary in order to
make the six-mile approach march.
Captain Wray’s Charlie Company, in the lead, was to take Objective 1,
the southwestern nose of Hill 1081, and hold it while the other two
companies passed through to carry out their missions. Captain Barrow’s
Able Company was to attack east of the MSR and fight its way to the
summit of Hill 1081; and Captain Noren’s Baker Company to advance to
the left flank, along the slopes between Barrow and the MSR.[590]
[590] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived
from the following sources: _Ibid._; 1stMar _SAR_, 19–20,
24–26; 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_; Bates interv, 16 Mar
53, 108–112, Geer, _The New Breed_, 364–368; Col D. M.
Schmuck, LtCol D. W. Bridges, LtCol W. L. Bates interv,
8 Aug 56; special mention should also be made of the
two-part article, “Last Barrier,” by S. L. A. Marshall in
the _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 20–23,
and no. 2 (Feb 53), 40–46; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 14
Dec 56.
The combination of snow and darkness reduced visibility almost to zero
as 1/1 set out along the slippery MSR five hours before daybreak. All
heavy equipment had been sent to the rear from Chinhung-ni, and the
only vehicles were two ambulances and a radio jeep.
In the snow-muffled silence of the night the men took on protective
coloring as feathery flakes clung to their parkas. Objective 1 was
seized shortly after dawn, following a difficult approach march against
negligible resistance. The battalion commander prepared for the next
phase by bringing up 81mm mortars and an attached platoon of 4.2s and
emplacing those weapons in Wray’s position. He also directed that the
five attached Army self-propelled quad-.50 caliber and twin 40mm guns
of B Company 50th AAA (AW) Bn be moved to a little rise off to the
left of the road in the vicinity of the village of Pehujang. From this
position they covered the MSR as far as the bridge over the penstocks.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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