U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
[593] 7thMar _SAR_, 25; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; CO 1/7 msg to CO
7thMar, 1341 8 Dec 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 362–363.
LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 26 Oct 56.
Division OpnO 26-50 had directed Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s RCT-5 to
await orders before attacking Objective D. It was nearly noon on the
8th before the 1st Battalion, in assault, was directed to move out from
Koto-ri.
Lieutenant Colonel Stevens followed the MSR for a mile, then sent
two companies out to the left to occupy the objective, Hill 1457.
Baker Company seized the intervening high ground and set up to cover
the attack of Charlie Company up the slopes of the ridge leading to
the objective. Charlie Company fell in with a patrol from the Army
Provisional Battalion attached to the RCT-7, and the two combined
forces to drive the enemy off the high ground about 1550. A weak
Chinese counterattack was easily repulsed, and at 1700 as darkness fell
Baker and Charlie Companies tied in with the Army troops while Able
Company formed its own perimeter overlooking the MSR. In reserve, the
41st Commando moved into the high ground behind 1/5 to guard against
infiltration.[594]
[594] 1/5 _SAR_, 19; S-3 5thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 8
Dec 50; Maj Stewart tel to CO 5thMar, 1940 8 Dec 50;
5thMar _SAR_, 34; Smith, _Notes_, 1072.
The day’s story would not be complete without reference to the
Treadway bridge train, which moved out about 1400 on the 8th in the
trace of 1/7. Instructions were to install the sections at the first
opportunity, but the site had not been secured as darkness approached.
A few Chinese mortar rounds falling in the vicinity of the vulnerable
Brockway trucks influenced a decision to return them closer to
Koto-ri.[595]
[595] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to CO 1stEngBn, 1325 8 Dec 50; G-3
1stMarDiv tel to G-3 X Corps, 1450 8 Dec 50, in G-3
Journal, X Corps _CR_, 8 Dec 50; D/Engrs _SAR_, 10.
Summing up the attacks of 8 December, weather and terrain had done more
than the enemy to prevent all assault units of the 1st Marine Division
from securing their assigned objectives. Casualties had not been heavy,
however, and for the most part the troops were in a position for a
renewal of their efforts in the morning.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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