U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
During the early morning hours of the 10th George Company of 3/1
beat off an attack on Objective A by an enemy force estimated at 350
men. This was the only noteworthy instance of CCF activity otherwise
limited to scattered shots, and it was believed that the Communists
were side-slipping southward, parallel with the MSR. Confirmation of
that assumption came at 1200, when Able Company of 1/1 sighted Chinese
marching in platoon and company columns through the valley only about
1000 yards east of Hill 1081. Almost simultaneously other dense CCF
columns crossed the field of fire of the attached Army self-propelled
AAA guns while pouring around an adjacent slope. Lieutenant Colonel
Schmuck called immediately for air strikes and artillery fires. Able
Company hit the enemy with 4.2″ and 81mm mortar rounds, and the Army
teams cut loose with .50 cal. and 40mm bursts. The slaughter continued
for an hour as the Chinese kept on moving southward with that fatalism
which never failed to astonish the Marines.
Baker Company of 1/1 launched an assault with close air support at
1300 on a CCF strong point adjacent to the railroad and north of
the battalion’s positions overlooking the MSR. Noren’s men found
3.5″ rocket launchers their most effective weapon when clearing the
Communists from heavily timbered and sandbagged bunkers. Excellent
close air support was received, though two Marine KIA casualties
resulted from an error by Navy planes.[608]
[608] 1stMarDiv _PIR 47_. Bates interv, 16Mar53;
Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Schmuck Comments.
All day the seemingly endless column of vehicles and troops wound
southward along the twisting mountain road. At 1030 General Smith
and key members of his staff displaced from Koto-ri and proceeded by
C-47 and helicopter to the rear CP of the Division at Hungnam. By
1800 both Division trains, all elements of RCT-7 and the 1st, 3d, and
4th Battalions of the 11th Marines had closed Chinhung-ni. There the
infantrymen entrucked for Hungnam.[609]
[609] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; 11thMar _SAR_, 9–10; Smith _Chronicle_,
112; 1stMTBn _SAR_, 14; Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.
The 5th Marines column followed the 7th, with 3/5 leading the way
and 2/5 close behind. Just south of Objective A a brief fire fight
was necessary to silence a CCF machine gun, whereupon the movement
continued without further incident until the two battalions reached
Chinhung-ni at dusk. The 1st Battalion was not relieved by 2/1 until
1800 and did not close Chinhung-ni until the early morning hours of the
11th.[610]
[610] 5thMar _SAR_, 34–36; 1/5 _SAR_, 20; 2/5 _SAR_, 31; 3/5
_SAR_, 17–18; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 19 Oct
56.
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