U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
[616] 1stMar _OpnO 16-50_, 7 Dec 50. This order issued before
the decision to send the tanks down the MSR in one group
makes no mention of protecting the armor.
The first departure from plan occurred when Lieutenant Colonel Sutter
discovered, after starting up Hill 1457, that Objective D was so far
from the road and so steep that most of the night would be required
merely for the battalion to make the climb. No enemy having been
sighted, he asked permission to return to the road and continue along
the MSR. This request was granted by Colonel Puller and 2/1 resumed
the march, followed by 2/11(-), 2/31 and H&S Company of RCT-1 in that
order. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s 3/1, which remained on Objectives A,
B and C until 2100, fell in at the end of the regimental column.[617]
[617] 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_, 18; Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.
About midnight, after waiting for 3/1 to move down the pass, the
tank column began its descent with only Recon Company as protection.
Lieutenant Hargett’s platoon of 28 men guarded the last ten tanks and
the other two platoons screened the middle and head of the column.[618]
Behind the last machine, approaching as close as they dared, were the
thousands of refugees. CCF soldiers had mingled with them, watching
for an opportunity to strike, and Hargett had the task of keeping the
Koreans at a respectful distance.
[618] Neither Capt Bruce F. Williams, commanding Baker Company,
nor his platoon leaders realized that Hargett’s men were
screening the rear of the tank column. Maj B. F. Williams
Comments, 26 Dec 56.
Progress was slow as the 40 tanks inched around the icy curves with
lights on and dismounted crewmen acting as guides. Shortly before
0100 the ninth machine from the rear had a brake freeze which brought
the tail of the column to a halt for 45 minutes. The rest of the
tanks clanked on ahead, leaving the last nine stranded along the MSR
southwest of Hill 1457 and about 2000 yards from the treadway bridge.
The enemy took advantage of the delay when five CCF soldiers emerged
in file from among the refugees as a voice in English called that they
wished to surrender.[619]
[619] This description of the ambush at the rear of the tank
column is based upon: Capt E. C. Hargett, interv by
HistBr, G-3, 14 Dec 53; Maj W. Gall, 1stLt R. B. Grossman
[sic], 1stLt F. R. Kraince, 1stLt E. C. Hargett, 2dLt
C. E. Patrick, and 2dLt D. W. Sharon, interv by Capt K.
A. Shutts, 11 Feb 51; _MCB Study_, II-C-111–113; Smith,
_Notes_, 1087; HqBn _URpt 14_; Williams Comments, 26 Dec
56; Maj E. C. Hargett Comments, 17 Oct 56.
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