U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
_Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area_
While the remaining X Corps units completed outloading at Hungnam, the
Marines were landing at Pusan and proceeding by motor march to their
new assembly area in the vicinity of Masan. General Craig, the ADC, had
gone ahead with the advance party from Hungnam and made arrangements
for the reception of the Division.[640]
[640] Smith, _Notes_, 1126. A detailed account of the arrival
of the 1st Marine Division at Pusan and Masan will be
found in the first chapter of Volume IV of this series.
News from the front in West Korea was not encouraging as the Eighth
Army planned further withdrawals, for G-2 reports indicated that the
advancing Chinese were about to launch a great new offensive shortly.
Despite the persistent rumors that all Korea might be evacuated by UN
forces, General MacArthur insisted in his special communique of 26
December that operations “were skilfully conducted without loss of
cohesion and with all units remaining intact....
In its broad implications I consider that these operations,
initiated on 24 November and carried through to this [Hungnam]
redeployment, have served a very significant purpose--possibly in
general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted
during the course of the Korean campaign.
The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without
warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command
but without attaining a decision.
Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or
even detect, we did not achieve the United Nations objective.
But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable
period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed
before too late secret political and military decisions of
enormous scope and threw off balance enemy preparations aimed at
surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces
with one mighty extended blow.”[641]
[641] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50.
Questions as to the proper evaluation of the Eighth Army withdrawal
turned into a controversy during coming months with political as well
as military implications. Press representatives, military critics
and soldiers of other nations, while crediting MacArthur with a
great victory at Inchon, were for the most part of the opinion that
the Eighth Army withdrawal of November and December was a costly
reverse.[642]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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