On closer inspection, however, such first impressions could only prove to be illusory. The most prominent building in the Korean village was a new schoolhouse with the onion-shaped dome of Russian architecture. An incongruous and pretentious structure for such a small peasant community, it had been erected not so much for the instruction of children as the indoctrination of adults in Communist principles. Majon-ni, in short, had been for five years a hotbed of forced culture in the doctrines of the Communist puppet state set up in northern Korea after World War II by the occupation forces of Soviet Russia. And it was here that the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines arrived on 28 October 1950. Relief of elements of the 26th ROK Regiment at 1600 enabled those troops to return to Wonsan in the vehicles which had brought 3/1.[159] [159] CO 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1900 28 Oct 50; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 7, 2. The Marines had been assigned the mission of “setting up a defensive position at Majon-ni, destroying enemy forces, and denying them the use of this road net.” In addition, the unit was “to patrol roads to the north, south, and west, and keep the road open between Majon-ni and Wonsan.”[160] [160] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1730 27 Oct 50. See also CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1515 27 Oct 50; 1stMar _OpnO 9-50_, 27 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv _AdmO 14-50_, 27 Oct 50. This last directive was soon modified by oral instructions relieving the battalion from the responsibility of keeping open the Wonsan-Majon-ni road. The reason for the change was apparent when the troops of 3/1 covered the 28-mile route by motor lift in two echelons on the afternoon of the 28th. After leaving the seaport and alluvial plain, the shelf-like road twists precariously through a 3000-foot pass. This stretch abounds in hairpin turns and deep gorges which are ideal for setting a tactical trap, and the route was soon to be known to the troops as Ambush Alley. Although traversable by tanks, it offered too much danger from roadblocks and landslides to permit the dispatch of the iron elephants.[161] [161] Col T. L. Ridge, _Notes on Operations in North Korea_, 9 Sep 55 (hereafter Ridge, _Notes_) and comments on preliminary draft, 28 Feb 56; Andrew Geer, _The New Breed_ (New York, 1952), 203. [Illustration: MAJON-NI AND ROAD TO WONSAN A Ambush of 2 Nov 50 B Ambush of 3 Nov 50 C Ambush of 7 Nov 50 D Ambush of 12 Nov 50 E Ambush of H Co., 2 Nov 50 MAP-5 ] The strategic importance of the Majon-ni area derived from its position at the headwaters of the river Imjin and the junction of roads leading east to Wonsan, south to Seoul, and west to Pyongyang. They were being traveled extensively at this time by NKPA troops escaping northward in civilian clothes after the collapse of the Red Korean military effort.