[196] 1stMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv 1030 and 1910, 9 Nov 50; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 9; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 14. Ruffner ltr 13 Jan 56. X Corps directed that upon the relief of the Marines by the 3d Infantry Division, the 3d and 5th KMC Battalions, which had been under the operational control of RCT-1, would then be attached to the Army unit.[197] [197] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 12 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 492–493; Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 73; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2305 11 Nov 50. After lack of transport imposed a delay of two days, 1/1 initiated the northward movement of RCT-1 by rail and closed Chigyong, eight miles southwest of Hamhung, by 1820, 14 November. A motor convoy followed.[198] [198] 1stMarDiv _POR_ 145; Smith, _Notes_, 494; 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1845 15 Nov 50; Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 73. Relief of 2/1(-), which had been holding screening and blocking positions on Ambush Alley, was completed on the 15th by the 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry. Other Army elements relieved Dog Company in the rear area near Wonsan. On the 16th 2/1 moved by rail to Chigyong, followed by 3/1 and the last elements of RCT-1 the next day.[199] [199] 2/1 _SAR_, 9–10; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2245 15 Nov 50; 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_; 1stMar _SAR_, 12; 1stMarDiv _POR 154_; Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 73; Sutter Comments, 2 Feb 56. Thus the 1st Marine Division achieved a relative and temporary degree of concentration. The farthest distance between components had been reduced from 130 to less than 60 miles by the middle of November, but a new dispersion of units was already in progress. CHAPTER V Red China to the Rescue _Chinese in X Corps Zone--Introducing the New Enemy--Communist Victory in Civil War--Organization of the CCF--The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier--CCF Arms and Equipment--Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign--CCF Strategy and Tactics_ Up to this time the 1st Marine Division had virtually been waging two separate wars. In the southern zone, as was related in the last two chapters, blocking and screening operations were conducted by RCT-1 against NKPA remnants. RCT-7, with RCT-5 in reserve, had meanwhile been confronted in the north by some of the first Chinese Communist troops to enter the Korean conflict. In order to trace the movements of these two Marine regiments, it will be necessary to go back over chronological ground previously covered. Division OpnO 18-50, issued on 28 October to implement X Corps OI-13 and supplementary telephone orders received from Corps, assigned RCT-7 the mission of proceeding from Wonsan to Hamhung, prepared for an advance to the Manchurian border 135 miles to the north. RCT-5 was assigned a zone behind RCT-7 (see end-paper maps).