U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
On the other hand, the Chinese Reds broke with both Nationalist and
Communist tradition in their policy of avoiding a permanent rank
system. Officers (in Korea denoted by red piping on their sleeves) were
divided into company, field, and general groups. The company commander
and political officer held about equal authority in an infantry unit,
and the only NCOs mentioned in CCF field reports are sergeants and
squad leaders.[223]
[223] ADVATIS FWD Rpt 0213 in EUSAK _WD_, 14 Nov 50; G-3 _SAR_,
21–22.
_CCF Arms and Equipment_
The CCF depended on a wide assortment of weapons, so that it was
not uncommon to find several different kinds of rifles of varying
calibers in the same regiment. Japanese arms acquired after the
surrender of 1945; Russian arms furnished by the Soviets; and American,
German, Czech, British, and Canadian arms taken from the Chinese
Nationalists--these were some of the diverse sources. And it is a
tribute to the adaptability of the Chinese Reds that they managed to
utilize such military hand-me-downs without disastrous confusion.
Paper work was at a minimum in a force which kept few records and
numbered a great many illiterates. As for logistics, each soldier
was given a four-day food supply in the winter of 1950–1951 when he
crossed the Yalu--usually rice, millet or soy beans carried in his
pack. Afterwards, food was to be procured locally by extortion or
confiscation, though the Communists were fond of using such euphemisms
as “purchase” or “donation” to denote those processes.[224]
[224] There is some evidence of an attempt to supply troops
from division stocks. See ADVATIS 1245 in EUSAK _WD_, 4
Dec 50, and 164-MISDI-1176 in _Ibid._, 1 Nov 50. Normal
CCF doctrine, however, held that a division should be
committed to combat for about six days and then withdrawn
to replenish its supplies and replace casualties. This
procedure, naturally, definitely limited the extent of an
attack by the CCF and prevented the maintenance of the
momentum for an extended offensive. MajGen D. G. Barr
testimony in _MacArthur Hearing_, 2650; Bowser Comments,
23 Apr 56.
The CCF soldiers who fought in Korea during the winter of 1950–1951
wore a two-piece, reversible mustard-yellow and white uniform of
quilted cotton and a heavy cotton cap with fur-lined ear flaps. Issued
to the troops just before crossing the Yalu, the quilted cotton blouse
and trousers were worn over the standard summer uniform and any other
layers of clothing the soldier may have acquired.
The first CCF units in action had canvas shoes with crepe rubber soles.
Later arrivals were issued a half-leather shoe or even a full leather
boot. Chinese footwear was of poor quality and few of the troops wore
gloves in cold weather. The consequence was a high rate of frostbitten
hands and feet.[225]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account