Five to nine men [CCF] patrols were sent out forward of the main body in an attempt to locate or establish [our] front lines and flanks. After these patrols had withdrawn or been beaten off, white phosphorus mortar shells were dropped about the area in an attempt to inflict casualties. By closely watching the area for movement in removing these casualties, they attempted to establish the location of our front lines. After establishing what they believed were the front lines, white phosphorous shells were dropped in the lines and used as markers. While this was taking place, the assault troops crawled forward to distances as close as possible to the front lines ... [and] attacked at a given signal. The signal in this particular instance was three blasts of a police whistle. The attacking troops then rose and in a perfect skirmish formation rushed the front line.[236] [236] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 9_. The remainder of the section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: _Ibid._; G-2 _SAR_, 13–45; 1stMar _SAR_, 28–29; 5thMar _SAR_, 38–44; EUSAK _Combat Information Bulletin No. 4_; FMFPac, _CCF Tactics_, 1–5. It might be added that this attack resulted in a CCF penetration on a platoon front. Friendly lines were restored only by dawn counterattacks. The ambush was a favorite resort of Chinese commanders. Whatever the form of attack, the object was usually fractionalization of an opposing force, so that the segments could be beaten in detail by a local superiority in numbers. CCF attacking forces ranged as a rule from a platoon to a company in size, being continually built up as casualties thinned the ranks. Reports by newspaper correspondents of “hordes” and “human sea” assaults were so unrealistic as to inspire a derisive Marine comment: “How many hordes are there in a Chinese platoon?” After giving CCF tactics due credit for their merits, some serious weaknesses were also apparent. The primitive logistical system put such restrictions on ammunition supplies, particularly artillery and mortar shells, that a Chinese battalion sometimes had to be pulled back to wait for replenishments if the first night’s attack failed. At best the infantry received little help from supporting arms.[237] [237] These weaknesses, however, were confined to the early months of CCF participation in the Korean conflict. Following the peace talks in the summer of 1951--an interlude with the enemy exploited for military purposes--the Chinese gradually built up to an equality with UN forces in mortars and artillery.