U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
On the left of 2/1, the 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La
Hue) could not make much progress toward its regimental objective, Hill
751, while the enemy was active on Hill 749. A second attack of 2/1
at 1500 drove to the summit of that height after fierce fighting with
small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. There was still much
fighting to be done before the entire objective would be secured since
many enemy bunkers hidden among the trees remained to be neutralized.
At 1600 a gap of about 300 yards separated 2/1 from the two 2/7
companies. So fierce was enemy resistance in this area that it took
until 2025 for Nihart’s men to complete the relief after fighting for
every foot of ground.
Air and artillery support had been excellent on the 13th despite the
fact that neither could be called by 2/1 in some instances because
of the danger of hitting elements of 2/7. Even so, 2/11 (Lieutenant
Colonel Dale H. Heely) and other artillery units fired 2,133 rounds
and Company C of the 1st Tank Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly
H. Evans) contributed 720 rounds of 90mm fire which knocked out six
enemy bunkers. The 4.2″ mortars had a busy day firing 261 HE and 28 WP
rounds, and Company C of the 1st Engineer Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
John V. Kelsey) supported the attack by clearing mine fields.
Mortar fire was received by the 1st Marines throughout the night,
and 3/1 repulsed a series of counterattacks by an estimated 300
enemy. Colonel Wornham’s regiment continued the attack at 0800 on 14
September. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions inched their way forward
against a heavy volume of well-aimed enemy mortar, artillery, and
automatic weapons fire.
NKPA resistance persisted on the wooded northern slope of Hill 749,
where hidden bunkers had to be knocked out, one by one. It took
constant slugging for 2/1 to advance 300 meters before dusk, enabling
3/1 to fight its way to the summit of Hill 751. Again the flat
trajectory fire of Company C tanks had been helpful as 400 rounds were
directed against NKPA bunkers, while the 11th Marines fired 3,029
rounds.
The 15th was a relatively quiet day as compared to the previous 48
hours. In preparation for an expected passage of lines, the action took
a slower tempo as units consolidated their positions. The principal
fight of the day was a continuation of the attack by 2/1 north of
Hill 749. Although the battalion commander had arranged for a heavy
artillery preparation, the attack, which jumped off at 1710, was
stopped at 1800 by a terrific pounding from NKPA mortars and artillery
coupled with a crossfire of machine guns from concealed bunkers. The
assault troops withdrew under effective covering fire by the 11th
Marines to positions occupied the previous night. Objective BAKER yet
remained to be secured.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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