U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
_Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884_
Division OpnO 27-51, it may be recalled, had directed the Marines to
extend the X Corps boundary eastward by taking over the sector of the
11th Regiment, I ROK Corps. Even under ordinary circumstances this
would have meant an exhausting 15-hour march for the relieving troops
merely to climb Hill 884 (Map 20), The position was accessible only on
foot, and supplies had to be brought on the backs of cargadores.
Because of the isolation of this wildly mountainous area, a
reconnaissance was deemed essential. Major General Gerald C. Thomas,
commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, assigned that mission to
the Division Reconnaissance Company after deciding on a troop lift by
helicopter.
He was aware, of course, that no such operation had ever been
undertaken during the brief history of rotary-wing aircraft.
Large-scale helicopter troop lifts were still at the theoretical stage.
Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring, commanding officer of HMR-101,
had but 48 hours for preparation. He and his executive officer,
Lieutenant Colonel William P. Mitchell, worked out a tactical and
loading plan with the commanding officer of Recon Company, Major
Ephraim Kirby-Smith, and the acting Division Embarkation Officer, First
Lieutenant Richard C. Higgs.[306]
[306] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified, are
the following: DivReconCo _HD_, 1stShorePartyBn _HD_,
HMR-161 _HD_, Sep 51; Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of
Assault Helicopters,” 7–13; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 162–165.
An air reconnaissance of Hill 884 disclosed only two acceptable
locations for landing sites, both approximately 50 feet square with a
sheer drop on two sides. About 100 yards apart and some 300 feet below
the topographical crest, each could be cleared sufficiently for the
landing of a single aircraft.
Major Kirby-Smith decided on the order in which troops of his company
and attached units would be landed. The assignment and loading
tables were completed on 20 September in time for a rehearsal. All
participants were instructed as to their team numbers and embarkation
points.
H-Hour of Operation SUMMIT (Map 21) was set for 1000 on 21 September.
The plan called for a preliminary landing of a Recon Company rifle
squad to provide security. Next, a landing point team from the 1st
Shore Party Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Edwards) had the
mission of clearing the two sites. These two groups were to disembark
from hovering helicopters by means of knotted 30-foot ropes. Strong
winds at the 2,900-foot altitude made landing quite hazardous.
The execution was delayed half an hour by the ground fog so prevalent
at this time of year. As soon as the two landing sites were cleared
(about 40 minutes), word was transmitted by radio for the loading to
begin at Field X-83 (Map 21), about 14 miles southwest of Hill 884 by
the defiladed route of flight.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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