U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Even before the Chinese had made their coordinated attack against Hill
122 in the midafternoon of the 12th, the 1st Marines had implemented
a plan of action to assure that the critical position would remain
in Marine hands. In addition to the movement of Company I/3/1 to
reinforce Bunker Hill and of Company I/3/7 as its relief on the MLR,
a precautionary displacement was also made of the 3/1 reconnaissance
platoon to Hill 124 to tie in that terrain feature with both Bunker
and JAMESTOWN and thus consolidate the defense north of the MLR and
west of Bunker. (See Map 11.)
[Illustration:
MAP 11 K. WHITE
BUNKER HILL AREA
2300, 12 AUGUST 1952]
Other activities behind the line aimed at making the Marine position
on the newly seized hill more tenable. As one step in this direction,
General Selden shifted most of his reserve into the zone of action.
Before the end of the day remaining units of 3/7 were placed under
operational control of 3/1, and 2/7 was attached to Colonel Layer’s
reserve. The 7th Marines was directed to place its 4.2-inch mortars
on call to the 1st Marines. Priority of artillery support went to the
Bunker Hill regiment. Within the 1st Marines, the regimental commander
moved two provisional platoons (118 Marines) of the reserve 1st
Battalion to the 3d Battalion sector. All 81mm mortars in 1/1 were sent
to the left battalion. The fire plan also called for employment of all
the 60mm mortars that could bear on the crest of 124–122, with 81mm and
artillery box-me-in barrage fires on the ridge and flanks.
Machine guns from the MLR were assigned missions on the crest of Bunker
Ridge and 4.5-inch ripples were planned on the deep enemy approaches.
Gun and flame tanks were to protect the right flank of Hill 122 where
the steep draw between Bunker and the MLR offered the most dangerous
approach into Bunker Hill. Supplies and fortification materials,
meanwhile, were being carried forward and casualties taken to the rear
by the relief party. Although 3/1 initially reported that the Bunker
Hill fighting had resulted in 58 killed or wounded Marines, a later
battalion count showed this number to be 34--5 killed and 29 wounded.
Most of the casualties had been caused by hostile shelling. Although
the Hill 122 reverse slope afforded some cover from the Chinese
artillery and mortars, the positions on the crest did not offer any
protection, so Marines continued their trenchworks and other defensive
preparations at a rapid pace and supporting fires were registered by
1900. The approach of night was certain to bring renewed Communist
attempts to capture Bunker Hill.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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