U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
About two hours later a brief fire fight flared up in the Company B
sector. No ground assault was made on Marine positions. The enemy
force, of undetermined strength, never closed with the Marines and
within 10 minutes, the firing stopped. No casualties to the Marines
resulted during this exchange. The earlier clash had resulted in the
death of 3 Marines and the wounding of 27. Enemy losses were estimated
at 40 killed and 30 wounded.
Before it came off the hill, Company B was engaged by enemy fire three
more times. At 1945, Chinese mortars (82mm) wounded two Marines.
Later, heavier mortars placed 20 rounds on Hill 122, but these caused
no casualties. There were some losses, however, early on the morning
of the 17th when C/1/1 was relieving the Bunker defenders. Captain
Scranton’s Marines sustained five more wounded from automatic weapons,
five during the relief.
The second relief of Company B on Bunker brought to a close the battle
that had been waged for possession of the vital hill complex. During
the Hill 122 tours of Company C and other 1st Marines units that
followed in August, seven more ground actions tested the Bunker Hill
defenses. Only one of them, during the night of 25–26 August, was of
significant size. This attack also failed to dislodge the Marines from
the hill.
_Supporting Arms at Bunker Hill_[189]
[189] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 4–16 Aug 52;
1st Mar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs,
Aug 52.
It was quite natural that the flurry of ground activity during the
battle of Bunker Hill created a need for increased participation from
Marine supporting arms. The magnitude of infantry action during the
contest for Hill 122 resulted in a monthly record to date in 1952
for the amount of air support received as well as the volume of both
artillery and tank fires supporting the division. During this critical
9–16 August period, the 11th Marines played a part in every ground
action except the feint attack on Siberia and the seizure of Bunker
Hill, both of which were purposely executed without an artillery
preparation. Medium tanks fired day and night missions during most of
the infantry action. Close air support at times amounted to a strike
every 20 minutes.
During the ground action around Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli, the
division received close air support in amounts unparalleled for
JAMESTOWN Marines to that time. Marine and U.S. Air Force pilots flew
a total of 458 missions (including 27 ground controlled MPQ-14 radar
bombing attacks) during five of the most critical days, 9–13 August.
On two of them, the 1st Marine Division received priority of close air
support along the whole EUSAK front. Fifth Air Force assigned 1st MAW
aircraft to Marine requests for close air support as long as Marine
aircraft were available.
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