U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
During the remainder of the battle of Bunker Hill, the ground fighting
subsided and the requirement for close air support abated accordingly.
On the 14th, only four daylight strikes were flown in the 1st Marines
area. These, all by Marine squadrons, were against active artillery and
mortars in the defilade of Hill 120 and others to the west on the far
slope of Hill 123, and Chinese outpost positions, west of 48A, which
had been pestering the Stromboli garrison. There were no flights after
dark on the 14th, but on the following night, two MPQ missions were
flown by VMF(N)-513. Each was a single plane flight against a reported
artillery location. This was the final night air action in the battle
for Bunker Hill. Daylight missions in support of Hill 122 defense after
the sharp decrease of attacks on the 14th numbered only seven attacks,
each by four planes. These, flown by Marines, continued to emphasize
the destruction of enemy artillery.
Marine artillery continued its support of ground troops and air
strikes. Cannoneers of the 11th Marines fired 21 flak suppression
missions during the five days beginning on 11 August. This type of
close coordination between Marine supporting arms further reduced
combat losses of aircraft providing CAS to the division. The Marine
artillerymen had played a vital part in the defense of the besieged
outposts. Lieutenant Colonel Armitage credited the box-me-in fires with
an important role in thwarting each enemy attack on Bunker.[191]
[191] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, pp. 3–4.
In the 24-hour period beginning at 1800 on 12 August, Marine artillery
directly supporting the 1st Marines fired 10,652 rounds. Most of the
ammunition was expended in support of the Bunker Hill defense; some
was used in behalf of the Marines outposting Stromboli during the
Communists’ early morning diversion that day. On the 9th, the direct
support battalion, 3/11 (Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Rogers), had
fired about one-fourth of the 12–13 August total. Many of the shells
that first day of the Bunker battle were preparatory to counterattacks
for regaining Siberia.
When the retaking of Hill 58A was discarded in favor of the surprise
attack on 122, the amount of artillery support was reduced, during
the 1st Marines infantry preparations on the 10th and 11th, in keeping
with the fire support plan. Upon seizure of Bunker, Lieutenant Colonel
Rogers’ business immediately picked up and quickly reached a crescendo
the following day, when the 10,652 shells fired became a Marine one-day
battalion record for western Korea until the last stages of fighting
in 1953. Other Marine artillery battalions fired reinforcing missions
during the critical period as did the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery which
fired a large number of on-call ripples. The regimental commander
later recalled that “during some of the crises every gun that could
bear on Bunker in the 11th Marines and reinforcing units was shooting
there.”[192]
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