U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Marine losses in the Hook battle were 70 killed, 386 wounded (286
evacuated), and 39 missing, of whom 27 were later definitely known
to have been captured. This was the second highest number of Marines
taken prisoner in any single action during the Korean fighting.[290]
Such a large number was attributed to the tactics of the Chinese
infantry, which followed the preparatory barrages so closely--at times
even advancing into the rolling barrages--that the enemy was able to
surprise and capture a considerable number of Marine outpost defenders.
Nearly all of the 27 were captured in the enemy’s first rushes against
the two outposts and MLR. In the diversion on Reno, an additional 9
Marines were killed and 49 wounded (29 evacuated).
[290] During the Task Force Drysdale operation, in November
1950, more than 40 Marines had been seized by the enemy.
Maj James Angus MacDonald, Jr., “The Problems of U.S.
Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea” (M.A. thesis,
Univ. of Maryland, 1961), App. G, pp. 261–262, hereafter
MacDonald, _POW_.
Perhaps as significant as any result of the Hook fighting is the amount
of supporting fires the Chinese provided their infantry. Calculations
of total incoming ran from 15,500 to 34,000 rounds during the 36-hour
engagement. The 1st Marine Division reported conservatively that the
enemy expended between 15,500–16,000 artillery and mortar rounds;
estimates by supporting arms units put the total at the higher level.
In any event, the 12,500 rounds the 7th Marines received during the
first 24 hours represented the heaviest bombardment any Marine regiment
had been subjected to up to that time. Moreover, it had now become
clearly evident that the enemy could stockpile a plentiful supply of
ammunition, despite attempts of UN aircraft to interfere with the
enemy’s flow of supplies to the frontline.[291]
[291] Comments by Dr. Robert F. Futrell, USAF Historian, in
ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 2 Feb 70: “The Air Force
position about the accumulation of munitions at frontline
units was that by exercising supply discipline and
refraining from combat, the enemy could hoard and build
supply over a period of time.”
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 160346]
_Marine Division Redeploys to West Korea--5th Marines units en
route to new sector in April 1952 are slowed by muddy roads and
spring thaws. Below, Korean washwomen labor at daily tasks while
1st Tank Battalion convoy moves up to new fighting area._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 160984]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164524]
_Surveillance of the Enemy--Men of the Reconnaissance Company,
1st MarDiv, scan CCF positions across the Imjin River. Below,
Marines empty 75mm shell cases from armored amphibian after a
shoot-out on Independence Day, 1952._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162962]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173690]
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