Marines gained a false sense of security by taking cover, in groups, inside bunkers. In some cases, groups of three or four Marines were killed when a bunker caved in on top of them. Had they been spread out along the trenchline, but under individual cover, it is believed that far fewer casualties would have resulted, and also the position would have been better prepared for defense. The false sense of security gained by being with comrades inside a bunker must be overcome.[294] [294] 1/7 ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI. Another factor bothered the 1/7 commander. He directed unit leaders to exercise closer control over the care and cleaning of weapons under their custody. During the Hook fighting, the malfunctioning of weapons due to improper cleaning and loss of some rifles “in the excitement to gain cover” caused the Marines to take casualties that might otherwise have been prevented. These same deficiencies were also observed by General Pollock, and he ordered their immediate correction. Lieutenant General Hart, CG FMFPac, whose inspection of the division coincided with the Hook battle and who saw the trenches after they had been leveled, noted that shallow trenches and bunkers built above the ground did not offer sufficient protection from intensive enemy shelling. He directed that more emphasis be placed on the digging of field fortifications and bunkers.[295] [295] CG, FMFPac ComdD, Nov 52, App IV, Encl (8), Anx G, p. 4. During the Hook fighting, General Hart also witnessed the helicopter deployment of the 4.5-inch rockets. He was impressed with the progress that had been made in this helicopter-ground team performance, particularly the speed and efficiency with which these weapons could be set up to fire and then displaced to a new position. In considering not only how the fight was conducted but why, one has only to go back to the first part of October and recall the situation that existed along the 1st Marine Division line. During the hotly contested outpost battles early in the month, the Chinese had attempted to outflank the division by seizing key terrain in the left and right sectors. Where the enemy had been unsuccessful, he returned later in the month for another major assault. On the night of the 26th the endeavor was in the division right. A new blow against the left was not far off. CHAPTER VI Positional Warfare _A Successful Korean Defense--Six Months on the UNC Line--Events on the Diplomatic Front--The Marine Commands During the Third Winter--1st MAW Operations 1952–1953 Behind the Lines--The Quiet Sectors--Changes in the Concept of Ground Defense--Before the Nevadas Battle_ _A Successful Korean Defense_[296] [296] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Oct-Nov 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 737–738, dtd 31 Oct-1 Nov 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 238–244, dtd 24–30 Oct 52.