U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Code-named WAKEUP, the raid was conducted in a manner typical of many
earlier forays against Chinese strongpoints. Its results, too, in most
respects were similar to the outcome of previous raids. Artillery
preparation of the objective area was accomplished, the infantry
assaults were somewhat short of the targets due to heavy CCF defensive
fires, and the prisoner-taking part of the mission was unfulfilled.
Counterbalancing this, and what made the raid of value to the regiment,
was the information gained about enemy defenses and Chinese reaction to
the raid. It was one of the rare occasions during which the CCF did not
employ artillery fire while their positions were under attack, using
instead mortars and automatic weapons against Marine assault forces.
Raids such as WAKEUP, patrols, and ambushes became the pattern of
action in late November and in December. Earlier in November some
changes in the MLR dispositions had taken place. On 3 November,
at 2345, the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch, 29th Infantry
Brigade, 1st Commonwealth Division, had relieved 1/7 of the Hook
sector responsibility, ending Marine occupation of that part of
JAMESTOWN.[312] And, on 16 November, the 7th Marines itself had been
replaced in line by the 1st Marines. In between these changes of
command on the frontlines, Generals Pollock and Jerome had received
many congratulations and well wishes from combat commands and from
government officials in the States. The occasion was the 177th birthday
of the Marine Corps. Both of these senior commanders passed on to their
Marines not only the Commandant’s Anniversary message but also the
congratulations of the UNC commander, General Clark.
[312] At this time a new limiting point between the division
and British division was also established. This slightly
reduced Marine division frontage to 33 miles and allowed
the two MLR regiments to shorten their lines and maintain
somewhat larger reserve units. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5,
Chap. 8, p. 8-23.
Though the Commonwealth division had taken over the Hook area from
the infantry Marines, the division’s participation in defense of
the British sector had not completely ended. On 18–19 November,
the 11th Marines expended more than 2,000 rounds to repel Chinese
attacks on the Hook. This firing by the artillery regiment helped to
repay the British for their “cooperation and outstanding artillery
and tank support during the engagements of 26–28 October....”[313]
And as the Commonwealth division commander, Major General M. M.
Austin-Roberts-West, had himself reported to General Pollock the day
following the Hook attack, “All hands on the Hook much appreciated the
prompt and effective support given last night. Grateful if you would
pass on their thanks to all concerned.”[314]
[313] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to GOC, 1stComWelDiv, dtd 29 Oct 52, in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App. II, p. 6.
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