The change of command relationships between CG, FAF and CG, 1st MAW earlier in the year[450] which had restored operational control of certain designated Marine air units to the wing commander, increased the efficiency of 1st MAW operations. Despite the fact that VMJ-1 at times contributed nearly 40 percent to the total FAF input of all daylight combat photographs,[451] aerial intelligence (both pre- and post-strike photos) supplied to wing and group headquarters was considered inadequate. As a MAG-33 intelligence officer commented with some exasperation as late in the war as May 1953: [450] See Chapter VI. [451] The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load “can be gauged by one day’s peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one half miles long.” _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-67. The Section continued to experience difficulty in obtaining 1:50,000 scale overlays of friendly MLR and OP positions. These overlays are important for making up target maps for close support missions, but they are continually held up for long periods by higher echelons, and, if received here at all, are then often too old to be considered reliable.[452] [452] MAG-33 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2. Similarly, at the individual squadron level, the carrier unit VMA-312 shortly before its relief, reported: “The one limitation on squadron activities continued to be photo coverage of the strikes. With limited facilities available, the squadron has no clear cut pictures of strike results.”[453] Return of VMJ-1 to operational control of General Megee ultimately “gave the Wing adequate photo-intelligence for the first time since commencement of combat operations in Korea.”[454] [453] VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2. [454] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-65. Indoctrination of new replacement personnel within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing took a swift upturn during the spring period. Pilots who had completed 100 combat missions were transferred to staff duty elsewhere in the wing in Korea or rotated Stateside. The average squadron personnel strength ran to 88 percent of T/O for enlisted; and officer strength, considerably less, frequently dipped as low as 61 percent. Under the 100-missions policy, it was a time of rapid turnover of unit commanders, too, as witnessed from the following squadron diary entries: _VMA-212_--Lieutenant Colonel James R. Wallace assumed command from Major Edward C. Kicklighter, effective 19 June; the latter had been squadron ExO and acting CO in interim period following 30 April departure of former CO, Lieutenant Colonel Smunk; _VMA-323_--Lieutenant Colonel Clarence H. Moore vice Lieutenant Colonel Frash, on 11 April; and Major Robert C. Woten succeeding Lieutenant Colonel Moore on 27 June; _VMA-121_--Major Richard L. Braun vice Lieutenant Colonel Hughes, on 21 April;