Evacuation of casualties and the utilization of air vehicles for transport of passengers and cargo proved to be the second asset in logistical operations. The Itami-based detachment of VMR-152 moved 7,757 personnel from the division and wing and 738.7 tons of cargo during April 1952. In addition, the R5D craft hauled a total of 325.2 tons of U.S. mail that month for the two Marine organizations. Speedy removal of patients to better equipped facilities in the rear by VMO-6 and HMR-161 helicopters was a giant step forward in life-saving techniques. VMO-6 usually provided this service, but early in April, Colonel McCutcheon’s squadron was assigned emergency medical evacuation duties to augment the observation squadron.[66] Pilots flew these evacuation missions with almost total disregard for adverse weather or darkness, and without radar control or adequate instrumentation for all-weather operations.[67] [66] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-69, p. 10-73. [67] _Ibid._, p. 10-68. Flights were not made in heavy fog. Test use by the Marine Corps Equipment Board of some of the equipment needed to navigate under conditions of reduced visibility was nearing the end of its development cycle. _Different Area, Different Problem_[68] [68] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23 Jul 53, Subj: Type “C” Rpt: “Civilian Affairs and the Korean Service Corps, Mar 52-May 53,” hereafter CG, 1stMarDiv ltr, _Civ Afrs and KSC_; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52; HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52. An additional responsibility the 1st Marine Division inherited when it moved to western Korea was control of civilians within the division boundary. In eastern Korea, all nonmilitary personnel had been evacuated from the vicinity of the MINNESOTA Line in the division sector; they had not been removed from the JAMESTOWN area. Prior to the arrival of the division in the west, the STAYBACK Line, averaging seven miles to the rear of the Imjin River and running in a generally northeast-southwest direction, had been established to limit the movement of civilian personnel in the forward areas. The Marines soon found that their predecessors must have been lax, however, in requiring that Korean civilians remain behind STAYBACK. What seemed equally unsuitable to the division was the poor military-civilian relationship that had apparently existed for some time.