U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Before this policy change took place another one, at a still higher
command level, had occurred. On 23 June, FAF planes struck at eight
North Korean hydroelectric plants in the central and northwestern part
of the country. The attack represented a departure from the intense
interdiction of enemy lines of communication (Operation STRANGLE)
which, since May 1951, had characterized FAF support operations. The
shift came about after a Far East Air Forces study on the effectiveness
of the interdiction campaign had concluded, in part, that the program
had been indecisive.[89]
[89] HistDiv; Air Univ, USAF, _United States Air Force
Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30
June 1952_, USAF Hist Study No. 72 (Washington, 1955),
p. 159, hereafter USAF, _Ops in Korea_, with appropriate
number. The Air Force operations were published in three
books, numbered 72, 73, and 127.
For more than a year preceding the 23 June attack, the Fifth Air Force
had concentrated its ground support efforts on the disruption of
Communist communication lines so that the enemy would be unable “to
contain a determined offensive ... or to mount a sustained offensive
himself.”[90] During the lifetime of the doctrine, no major offensive
had been launched by the enemy, and on this fact was based the claim
for success of the interdiction program. Opponents, however, pointed
out that despite this maximum FAF air effort, the Communists had built
up their strength, including support areas immediately to the rear
of their front lines and resupply installations. As the recent UN
commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway,[91] told members of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services on 21 May 1952, the same month that FAF had
begun to shift its air effort away from interdiction, “I think that the
hostile forces opposing the Eighth Army ... have a substantially greater
offensive potential than at any time in the past....”[92]
[90] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 435–436.
[91] General Mark W. Clark had succeeded Ridgway as UN
Commander on 12 May 1952. Ridgway was to take over as the
new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1 June, replacing
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was
returning to the United States.
[92] Cited in Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 435.
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