U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Quickly sizing up the situation, the company commander ordered the
1st Platoon to rejoin the rest of the assault force. As the platoon
began to pull back at 1435 the Chinese blanketed the route with a
heavy barrage, firing “over four hundred rounds in a five minute
period.”[125] This intense shelling took the lives of three Marines,
wounded a number of others, and halted the assault force just short of
its final goal. Even though the Chinese had been driven from the three
intermediate objectives, the devastating enemy mortar and artillery
fire made the Marine position untenable. A third of the platoon moved
back to Objective V; the rest worked their way along a route east
of that objective. While the rest of Company A and Weapons Company
elements occupied Hill T, the diversionary force, Company C, reinforced
by other Weapons Company personnel, had remained at a strongpoint not
far from Objective S. All supporting ground weapons assisted in the
withdrawal. In addition to lending direct fire support, Marine tanks
brought forward emergency supplies and evacuated casualties. By 1730,
the assault force had returned to friendly lines, followed shortly by
the rest of the battalion.
[125] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 10.
Although the battalion failed to seize and hold all of its objectives,
that part of the mission calling for inflicting casualties and taking
prisoners had been successfully executed.[126] Marines counted 35
enemy dead, 53 wounded, and 1 POW, and estimated that an additional
70 CCF had been killed and 105 wounded. Seven Marines were killed
and 66 wounded in the action described by some observers as “the
largest offensive effort the 1st Marine Division [has] made since last
September.”[127] The battalion fire support was well controlled and
coordinated from an observation post on the MLR. Five air strikes,
including one MPQ-14 mission, were credited with destroying three
artillery pieces and an equal number of mortars, damaging two other
mortars, and demolishing six personnel bunkers.
[126] Lieutenant Colonel Nihart believed that the heavy enemy
shelling, which had caused the early retirement of his
battalion, had been possible either because Chinese
mortar and artillery positions were so well camouflaged
that intelligence had not located them or else so well
protected that UNC counterbattery fire had failed to
destroy them. _Nihart comments._
[127] 5thMar ComdD, May 52, p. 9.
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