U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Even though the 1st Marine Division in July continued to be somewhat
in excess of its authorized strength in total personnel, it had
certain imbalances and was in rather short supply of certain ranks and
specialists. While the normal tour for most infantry officers ranged
from 9 to 12 months, an excess of company grade officers, particularly
lieutenants, had resulted in a reduction of the Korean tour for them
to just six months. This brief period of duty plus an intra-division
rotation policy that caused a mass shifting of duty assignments every
three-to-five months tended to reduce unit combat efficiency. On the
other hand the change of assignments had a favorable effect in that
it broadened the experience of individual Marines. Beginning in the
summer of 1952, however, the division modified this policy to reduce
its number of intra-division transfers.
Personnel shortages existed in both the artillery and tank MOSs
(Military Occupational Speciality). Mass rotation of reservist company
grade artillery officers had necessitated the transfer of infantry
officers to the 11th Marines for training and reassignment within the
regiment. During the time when the supply of artillery officers was
limited, however, the quality of support rendered remained high.[148]
The other major shortage in the division was that of qualified
crewmen--both drivers and gunners--for the M-46 tanks. Neither tank
driving nor gunnery for the M-46 was taught in the tank crewmen’s
course conducted at Camp Pendleton, California. General Selden
requested of Lieutenant General Franklin A. Hart (CG, FMFPac) that
“tank crewmen be thoroughly trained prior to leaving the U.S.”[149]
[148] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-27.
[149] 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 52, p. 4.
Fundamental to the tank problem was a shortage of the M-46 itself.
At the training facility, Training and Replacement Command, Camp
Pendleton, M-46 engines had been available for maintenance instruction
but no tanks for the training of gunners and drivers.[150] General
Hart pointed out this deficiency to the Commandant, General Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Jr. On 13 August the Commandant directed the transfer of five
tanks to the training installation from the 7th Tank Battalion,[151]
also located at Camp Pendleton. At the same time General Shepherd
ordered an increase in the school quota for tank crewmen. The first
graduates would not reach the division in Korea, however, until the
November draft.
[150] FMFPac ComdD, Jul 52, App VIII, Encl (7), Anx (E).
[151] FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App I, Encl (35).
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