U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964Whitlow, Robert H.
History
U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964
Whitlow, Robert H.
United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Vietnam War, 1961-1975
To be certain, the context of what should have been a rather
meaningless political feud had been altered substantively by North
Vietnam’s drive to extend its control over the Republic of Vietnam.
Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone for their southward
thrust, the North Vietnamese, joined by the Soviet Union, had
begun providing military aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftist
prince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. To counter these Communist
activities, the United States had extended military assistance to
the anti-Communist government of Prince Boun Oum. In the resultant
struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who previously had proclaimed
neutrality, sided with the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn and the
contenders now reinforced by powerful allies, the conflict naturally
escalated. Laos, like South Vietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War.
Administered through a small USMAAG, the American military assistance
to Boun Oum, however, did little to slow the advances of the Pathet
Lao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces with North Vietnamese
units to seize control of the eastern portion of the country’s long,
southward extending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed by North
Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao had opened an offensive on the Plain
of Jars in central Laos. Boun Oum’s units, commanded by General Phoumi
Nosavan, proved unable to contain this push into central Laos.
By March 1961 the situation had become critical enough for President
Kennedy to direct that CinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible
deployment. In response, Admiral Felt activated a task force
headquarters and assigned Major General Donald M. Weller, who was then
serving as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, as its commander.
Designated Joint Task Force 116 in accordance with existing CinCPac
contingency plans, Weller’s command was to consist predominantly of
Marine air and ground forces with Army and Air Force units making up
the balance. Simultaneous with the activation of Weller’s headquarters
on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted the scattered forces earmarked for
assignment to the joint task force.
Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration managed to defuse the situation
somewhat by securing Soviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in
Laos. The crisis cooled further when 14 governments, including the
Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene
the Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the Kingdom of
Laos. This conference convened on 16 May 1961, and together with
the shaky cease-fire, brought a modicum of stability to Laos. With
international tensions eased, the alert of U.S. forces in the Pacific
ended. Subsequently, General Weller’s JTF 116 headquarters was
deactivated.
[Illustration:
MAINLAND
SOUTHEAST ASIA
]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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