U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964Whitlow, Robert H.
History
U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964
Whitlow, Robert H.
United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Vietnam War, 1961-1975
[8-B] Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the Vietnamese
Marines seldom were involved in the actual construction
of strategic hamlets. This task was normally left to
the civil authorities in the area who more often than
not used the local population as a labor force. (_Moody
Comments._)
In the closing days of April, the JGS ordered Lieutenant Colonel
Khang to form two infantry battalions and an artillery element into a
provisional brigade for immediate assignment to II Corps. There the
Vietnamese Marines were to join elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN
Divisions for a multi-regiment thrust into the rugged mountains just
south of the I Corps-II Corps border. Code named BACH PHOUNG XI, this
offensive was to penetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area never
before entered by government forces. Centered in that portion of the
Annamite Mountains where the borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and
Kontum Provinces converged, the Do Xa had been under Communist control
since the early stages of the French-Indochina War. In this remote,
inaccessible mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedly had built-up
extensive staging areas and training camps. Prisoner interrogations
obtained throughout the early 1960s revealed that many North Vietnamese
soldiers entering the South’s northern provinces had infiltrated the
Do Xa before moving into the densely populated coastal lowlands of
Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Additionally, the area was thought
to contain the Communist military headquarters for Military Region 5
(MR-5).
After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a pack howitzer battery, a
reconnaissance platoon, and a headquarters element, Khang flew with
Lieutenant Colonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferences with Major
General Nguyen Khanh and his II Corps staff. The concept of BACH
PHOUNG XI, Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marine and Army
helicopters to lift ARVN infantry and artillery elements into positions
which would form a loose ring around the suspected center of the Do Xa
base area. The ARVN units would then begin contracting this ring in
stages, whereupon the provisional Marine brigade would be helilifted
into its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search for Communist camps.
To control the entire operation General Khanh would establish a corps
headquarters forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard village located on
the southern edge of the operations area, about 25 miles northeast of
Kontum.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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