U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964Whitlow, Robert H.
History
U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964
Whitlow, Robert H.
United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Vietnam War, 1961-1975
[10-C] Motivated at least partially by the requirement to
provide better support for the pacification strategy,
the Vietnamese government restructured its paramilitary
forces in the spring of 1964. The old Self Defense Corps
was expanded dramatically and renamed the Popular Force
(PF). The Civil Guard was reorganized and designated the
Regional Force (RF). More importantly, the RVNAF extended
its control over both paramilitary organizations for the
first time since their creation.
Coincident with the Chien Tang campaign, a similar but locally
concentrated pacification effort was instituted in the rural areas
around Saigon. Designated the Hop Tac Program, this campaign was
conceived in order to link the seven provinces around the capital into
a zone of intensive pacification in which closely coordinated military,
paramilitary, police, and civil activities would systematically reduce
Viet Cong strength. Because of their proximity to the area and their
availability, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the ARVN Airborne
Brigade were assigned primary responsibility for military operations in
support of the Hop Tac campaign. By midyear, the Chien Tang and Hop Tac
plans emerged as the backbone of General Khanh’s strategy to stave off
further Communist advances in critical areas of the country.
The development of the government’s newest pacification strategy,
however, was based on the assumption that the Viet Cong would pursue
a campaign to strengthen their control in South Vietnam’s populated
rural areas. Such was not the case. Instead, at midyear the Communists
began waging a brand of warfare characterized by large-scale mobile
operations against government military forces. Obviously the enemy had
shifted to the “general counter-offensive”--that phase of guerrilla
warfare designed to bring on the complete political and military
collapse of the opposition.
The new Viet Cong strategy revealed itself in two general geographic
areas during the fall months. In Binh Dinh Province on the coast of
northern II Corps, two Viet Cong main force regiments staged a series
of particularly swift and successful attacks which virtually eliminated
the government’s presence except in the province capital, Qui Nhon,
and a few district towns. In a coordinated offensive the Communists
increased pressure throughout that portion of the Central Highlands
west of Binh Dinh Province, thereby threatening to sever South Vietnam
along an axis that extended roughly between Qui Nhon on the coast and
Pleiku in the highlands. Meanwhile, another phase of the new initiative
unfolded in III Corps where the government’s Hop Tac campaign was
just getting underway. There the Communist offensive threatened to
neutralize the government’s concentrated pacification campaign.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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