[65] See White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. VI. [66] See White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. VII. [67] White Paper (Cd. 7329), Part II, No. II. [68] White Paper (Cd. 7329), Part III. [69] See _Parliamentary Debates_, vol. lx, p. 73. [70] Ibid., p. 426. [71] Cd. 7329, No. XVII. [72] Ibid., Nos. XVIII, XX. [73] Ibid., Nos. XXII, XXIII. [74] See _Parliamentary Debates_, vol. lx, p. 246. [75] Ibid., p. 400. [76] White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. XX. [77] _The Nineteenth Century and After_, January 1921, art. "The Army and Ireland," by Lieut.-Colonel John Ward, C.B., C.M.G., M.P. [78] Cd. 7318. [79] Cd. 7329. [80] _Parliamentary Debate_, vol. lxi, p. 765. [81] White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. XVII. See _ante_, p. 180. [82] White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. I. [83] Ibid., No. XXVII. CHAPTER XVII ARMING THE U.V.F. If the "evil-disposed persons" who so excited the fancy of Colonel Seely were supposed to be Ulster Loyalists, the whole story was an absurdity that did no credit to the Government's Intelligence in Ireland; and if there ever was any "information," such as the War Office alleged, it must have come from a source totally ignorant of Ulster psychology. Raids on Government stores were never part of the Ulster programme. The excitement of the Curragh Incident passed off without causing any sort of disturbance, and, as we have seen, the troops who were sent North received everywhere in Ulster a loyal welcome. This was a fine tribute to the discipline and restraint of the people, and was a further proof of their confidence in their leaders. Those leaders, it happened, were at that very moment taking measures to place arms in the hands of the U.V.F. without robbing Government depots or any one else. That method was left to their opponents in Ireland at a later date, who adopted it on an extensive scale accompanied by systematic terrorism. The Ulster plan was quite different. All the arms they obtained were paid for, and their only crime was that they successfully hoodwinked Mr. Asquith's colleagues and agents. Every movement has its Fabius, and also its Hotspur. Both are needed--the men of prudence and caution, anxious to avoid extreme courses, slow to commit themselves too far or to burn their boats with the river behind them; and the impetuous spirits, who chafe at half-measures, cannot endure temporising, and are impatient for the order to advance against any odds. Major F.H. Crawford had more of the temperament of a Hotspur than of a Fabius, but he nevertheless possessed qualities of patience, reticence, discretion, and coolness which enabled him to render invaluable service to the Ulster cause in an enterprise that would certainly have miscarried in the hands of a man endowed only with impetuosity and reckless courage. If the story of his adventures in procuring arms for the U.V.F. be ever told in minute detail, it will present all the features of an exciting novel by Mr. John Buchan.