Consciousness is an accompaniment of that animal and human organisation
and of that material mechanism which it is the province of physiology to
explore; and as long as the atoms of the brain follow their due course
according to certain definite laws, there arises an inner life which
springs from sensation and idea, from feeling and will.
We feel this in our own cases; it strikes us in our converse with other
people; we can see it plainly in the more highly organised animals; even
the lowest forms of life bear traces of it; and who can draw a line in
the kingdom of organic life, and say that it is here the soul ceases?
With what eyes, then, is physiology to regard this two-fold life of the
organised world? Shall she close them entirely to one whole side of it,
that she may fix them more intently on the other?
So long as the physiologist is content to be a physicist, and nothing
more—using the word “physicist” in its widest signification—his position
in regard to the organic world is one of extreme but legitimate
one-sidedness. As the crystal to the mineralogist or the vibrating
string to the acoustician, so from this point of view both man and the
lower animals are to the physiologist neither more nor less than the
matter of which they consist. That animals feel desire and repugnance,
that the material mechanism of the human frame is in chose connection
with emotions of pleasure or pain, and with the active idea-life of
consciousness—this cannot, in the eyes of the physicist, make the animal
or human body into anything more than what it actually is. To him it is
a combination of matter, subjected to the same inflexible laws as stones
and plants—a material combination, the outward and inward movements of
which interact as cause and effect, and are in as close connection with
each other and with their surroundings as the working of a machine with
the revolutions of the wheels that compose it.
Neither sensation, nor idea, nor yet conscious will, can form a link in
this chain of material occurrences which make up the physical life of an
organism. If I am asked a question and reply to it, the material process
which the nerve fibre conveys from the organ of hearing to the brain must
travel through my brain as an actual and material process before it can
reach the nerves which will act upon my organs of speech. It cannot, on
reaching a given place in the brain, change then and there into an
immaterial something, and turn up again some time afterwards in another
part of the brain as a material process. The traveller in the desert
might as well hope, before he again goes forth into the wilderness of
reality, to take rest and refreshment in the oasis with which the Fata
Morgana illudes him; or as well might a prisoner hope to escape from his
prison through a door reflected in a mirror.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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