Instinct is not a mechanism of brain or mind implanted in living beings
by nature; for, if it were, then instinctive action without any, even
unconscious, activity of mind, and with no conception concerning the
purpose of the action, would be executed mechanically, the purpose having
been once for all thought out by Nature or Providence, which has so
organised the individual that it acts henceforth as a purely mechanical
medium. We are now dealing with a psychical organisation as the cause
instinct, as we were above dealing with a physical. A psychical
organisation would be a conceivable explanation and we need look no
farther if every instinct once belonging to an animal discharged its
functions in an unvarying manner. But this is never found to be the
case, for instincts vary when there arises a sufficient motive for
varying them. This proves that special exterior circumstances enter into
the matter, and that these circumstances are the very things that render
the attainment of the purpose possible through means selected by the
instinct. Here first do we find instinct acting as though it were
actually design with action following at its heels, for until the arrival
of the motive, the instinct remains late and discharges no function
whatever. The motive enters by way of an idea received into the mind
through the instrumentality of the senses, and there is a constant
connection between instinct in action and all sensual images which give
information that an opportunity has arisen for attaining the ends
proposed to itself by the instinct.
The psychical mechanism of this constant connection must also be looked
for. It may help us here to turn to the piano for an illustration. The
struck keys are the motives, the notes that sound in consequence are the
instincts in action. This illustration might perhaps be allowed to pass
(if we also suppose that entirely different keys can give out the same
sound) if instincts could only be compared with _distinctly tuned_ notes,
so that one and the same instinct acted always in the same manner on the
rising of the motive which should set it in action. This, however, is
not so; for it is the blind unconscious purpose of the instinct that is
alone constant, the instinct itself—that is to say, the will to make use
of certain means—varying as the means that can be most suitably employed
vary under varying circumstances.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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