The Afghan Army, regarded as a fighting machine matched against civilized troops, could not be considered efficient. The Afghan, as a soldier, has many good qualities; he can live for days on a few handfuls of grain, and endure considerable fatigue at the same time; he can sleep in the open on the coldest night, wrapped in his sheepskin, and do no more than he is accustomed to; over mountains he is untiring; and he is plucky and would fight well, provided he had confidence in his officers. He also appreciates pluck, and Lieutenant Hamilton, who was with Cavagnari, and was one of those massacred, is to this day spoken of as the brave Feringhee. His own officers, however, are no better than himself in their knowledge of the art of war, and being chosen mostly from among the men, they have little authority as officers, and the influence of those who are looked up to by the men is entirely due to their own individuality. There is very little discipline, and unless an officer exerts his personality to make the men carry out his orders, he will find that they take very little notice of them, or him; for the soldiers are quick to judge who is their master, and leniency or consideration is looked upon by them as one of two things—fear of themselves, or the act of a fool. None of the generals have any knowledge of modern warfare, for their experience has been confined to the wild tribes of those countries brought under the rule of the Afghans of late years, and of those who fought against the English during the last war there are few, if any, living. When they talk of fighting any foreign power, they rely on the number of soldiers and hillmen that the preaching of the Jihad will influence to fight for their country; and another thing they look upon as advantageous to themselves is that the country is so broken up and mountainous, it would offer considerable difficulty to the effective and rapid movement of invading troops, and it is this which forms one of the Amir’s chief objections to the introduction of railways in his country. The Afghans rarely care to risk a pitched battle, and are besides more accustomed to guerilla warfare, and in the event of invasion it is the latter method of fighting which would, no doubt, be adopted, and among the mountain passes there are places where a few determined men, properly armed, could keep back an army. For an invading army there would be great difficulty in getting heavy artillery moved about in most parts of the country, and mule batteries would be required; but in the plains around Kabul, Jelalabad, and Kandahar, big guns would be wanted, at least equal in range to the Afghan guns, and to get these to the Kabul plains, except by two roundabout routes, would be very difficult.