The Amir, and those with him, rely a good deal on Jihad (religious war), which is to be preached by the mullahs in case an invading army crosses the frontier, and pamphlets on the subject have been printed and distributed all over the country. But as matters now stand, the people, although extremely fanatical, can hardly be relied on to fight very vigorously, or for any length of time. The army is supplied with modern field-guns, rifles, and ammunition, but, although of a modern pattern, they are few in number, and are not equal to those of other countries in range and accuracy. The army is also wholly untrained as compared with the troops of the two great powers on either side of them, and its officers have no more knowledge of modern warfare than the rank-and-file. It is only in the natural difficulties offered by the mountainous description of country to the effective movement of troops and transport of heavy guns that the Amir could hope to offer any serious opposition to an invading army, and it is unlikely that after the first stand made against the invader they would risk further battle. They would be more likely to resort to the guerilla methods common to them, cutting up small detachments and harassing the rear and lines of communication; but the larger the invading army, the less effective would these methods be. As a means of keeping unruly tribes in order, the Afghans are best left to govern themselves. Their methods of quelling rebellion and disorder are more ruthless, and therefore more effective and lasting, for the description of people dealt with than are the humane methods of other people. Amir Abdur Rahman, after killing off the bulk of a nation (men, women, and children) for rebelling against his authority, has had the remainder transported to a distant part of the country, where, rid of former associations and by intermarriage with other people, they have lost their old traditions, and settled down quietly to the new order of things. Should the English (or other power) occupy the country, the cost of an army of occupation, which would be necessary to keep the people in order, would probably equal that of the Indian army, until a new generation had grown up, more adaptable and willing to accept the altered condition of affairs.