Again the Middle States and the States of the Ohio Valley united in support of the protective principle. New England was divided against itself. Political considerations weighed heavily with those New Englanders who like Webster voted for the bill. John Randolph hardly exaggerated when he declared that "the bill referred to manufactures of no sort or kind, except the manufacture of a President of the United States." BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE To the bibliography at the close of the preceding chapter only a few titles need be added. The foreign policy of the Adams Administration is well described in F. E. Chadwick's _The Relations of the United States and Spain_ (1909). The stages in the Indian controversy may be traced in U. B. Phillips's _Georgia and State Rights_ (American Historical Association, _Report_, 1901), and in E. J. Hardin's _Life of George M. Troup_ (1859). E. M. Shepard, _Martin Van Buren_ (1888), and T. D. Jervey, _Robert Y. Hayne and His Times_ (1909), are important biographies. Josiah Quincy's _Figures of the Past_ (1883) contains some interesting sketches of Washington society, while N. Sargent's _Public Men and Events_ (2 vols., 1875) supplies an abundance of political gossip. CHAPTER XIX THE RISE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY Shortly after the Federal Convention of 1787, a friend remarked to Gouverneur Morris, "You have made a good constitution." "That," replied Morris laconically, "depends on how it is construed!" From Washington to Jackson the process of construing the Constitution had gone on, intermittently by the executive and legislative, steadily by the judiciary. "The judiciary of the United States," wrote Jefferson in 1820, "is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working underground to undermine the foundations of our confederate fabric. They are constantly construing our constitution from a coordination of a general and a special government, to a general and supreme one alone. They will lay all things at their feet, and they are too well versed in the English law to forget the maxim, '_boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem_.'" Yet as late as 1800 the federal judiciary had pronounced none of those decisions which were to make it so powerful a factor in the assertion and maintenance of national sovereignty. In declining an appointment as Chief Justice, John Jay wrote to President Adams that he had "left the bench perfectly convinced that under a system so defective, it would not obtain the energy, weight, and dignity, which were essential to its affording due support to the National Government; nor acquire the public confidence and respect which, as the last resort of the justice of the Nation, it should possess."