Next the Court considered the subject of restraint of trade in the export or international field and found that: “we are warranted in holding that the foreign trade of the Steel Corporation, its mode of building it up, and its retention when built up, are not contrary to the Sherman Law. To hold otherwise would be practically and commercially to enjoin the steel trade of the United States from using the business methods which are necessary in order to build up and maintain a dependable business abroad, and if the Sherman Law were so construed, it would itself be a restraint of trade and unduly prejudice the public by restraining foreign trade.” On the charge that the inherent nature of the Corporation was monopolistic, that the object of its organizers in bringing it together was for restraining trade the Court says, in part: “In view of the fact that the proportionate volume of competitive business has increased since the Steel Company was formed and that the proofs show no attempt by it to monopolize it to the exclusion of its competitors, to now attribute to those who formed the Corporation an intended monopolization would be to say that, having formed the Corporation for the purpose of monopoly, they immediately abandoned such purpose and made no effort to accomplish it.” The Court disposes of the matter of the purchase of the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., and of other purchases of steel properties criticized by the Government, by saying: “We cannot but feel, in the light of the proofs, that they were made in fair business course and were, to use the language of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case, ‘the honest exertion of one’s right to contract for his own benefit unaccompanied by a wrongful motive to injure others.’” Perhaps the most important point of divergence between the two opinions lies in the fact that Justice Woolley, with whom Justice Hunt concurred, held that it was the original purpose of the organizers of the Corporation to restrain trade. These judges found, however, that the big company did not attempt to exert a power, if it possessed it, to destroy its competitors; they say: “Upon the finding that the Corporation, in and of itself, is not now and has never been a monopoly or a combination in restraint of trade, a decree of dissolution should not be entered against it.” In denying the petition for a dissolution of the Corporation the Court stated that it would, if requested by the Government, retain the bill of complaint to restrain further action of this sort by the defendant corporation.