It might be suggested that the power of appointment could be lodged in the highest appellate tribunal of the state, the members of which had terms of considerable length, but were subject to election. This again is, no doubt, open to objections. But again, it could not possibly be a worse method than the one now employed. Judges of such courts are more easily than governors made responsible for the due administration of justice. They would have stronger motives than the governor for appointing men who could best carry on the administration of justice. No body of men in the state has a better opportunity for determining the character and ability of lawyers, since they examine the work of lawyers continually with most minute care. It has been suggested that vacancies in the judiciary should be filled by the appointment of the chief justice of the metropolitan district. He in turn should be chosen by the electorate of the district at fairly frequent intervals--viz., every four or six years--and in him should be vested large powers to oversee and direct the mode of organizing and handling the business of the court.[35] The objection which will at once be raised to this is that it presents an opportunity for the politocrats to obtain vast power by securing control of the chief justice. It is not difficult to demonstrate that the lodging of the appointing power in the hands of a responsible and conspicuous chief justice controlled by the politocrats would be much less inimical to the administration of justice than the appointment of judges in secret and without responsibility by the politocrats directly. The chief justice would, of course, only fill vacancies occurring during his short term. The guaranty to the public that such vacancies would be filled with fairly efficient men lies in the fact that enormous responsibility for the due administration of justice is focused upon a single man. Every complaint of inefficiency and impropriety comes home to him. Such a man cannot carry on the work of the court without the most efficient judges that he can possibly secure. This leads necessarily to procuring as judges members of the bar who have, in a successful practice in the courts, had a proper service test. Assuming that such a chief justice were the recognized deputy of the politocrats he would be driven by the necessities of the case, by the conspicuousness of his position, and the force of public opinion, to do his utmost to persuade the politocrats to permit him to appoint efficient men. That would produce an appointing power far better than the secret and utterly irresponsible method of direct appointment by the politocrats which now exists. A much more desirable result than this, however, is to be expected. Such a chief justice would be so important and conspicuous an officer and his power so great, that in his nomination and election the desires of the electorate as a whole would have to be much more fully considered than