It is the effect of the recall under normal circumstances, when no revolt against extra-legal government is in progress, that must principally concern us. At such times the recall is more valuable to the extra-legal government than it is to the electorate at large. The recall is as available to the extra-legal government as it is to the electorate at large. In fact, the extra-legal government must of necessity become familiar with its use. Every officer of the dummy legal government must, therefore, at all times act with the knowledge that the extra-legal government may start a recall election against him. Imagine what this means to the host of subordinate officers that were put in apparently by the electorate, but of whom the electorate never had any knowledge whatever. They have no popular following. They have no money with which to advise and instruct the voters of the character of the fight that is being made against them. What possible chance would such officeholders stand against the permanent organization of advisers and directors to the ignorant voter which the extra-legal government controls? The recall under normal, everyday conditions would place the majority of officeholders even more completely in the control of the extra-legal government than they are now. The recall, if applied to the judiciary, would in usual and normal times operate to give the extra-legal government the same power over the judges that it would have over other officeholders.[8] A judge is one of the most helpless of all elective officers. He can run on no platform; he can have no political program. He cannot point dramatically to any achievements on behalf of the people. Whether he is a good judge or not is a matter of expert opinion that only a comparatively few persons are competent to pass upon. His reputation can be easily blasted by the circulation of false statements. He may even be hurt by the performance of his duty in a particular case. His retention in office at elections is in a great number of instances purely a matter of accident. If he is up at a fall presidential election, his retention in office will practically depend upon the success of the national party in whose column his name happens to be. It will make little difference whether he has been one of the best judges that the county or state has ever had, or one of the worst. Elections place the judge very largely at the mercy of the extra-legal government. That government may not be able to return him to office, but the judge knows that without its support his re-election will become practically impossible. To give the extra-legal government the opportunity to use the recall upon a judge is to hold above the judge’s head at all times the threat of an extra election which he is in no wise prepared to undergo. Nothing could more clearly increase the power of the extra-legal government over the judiciary. If the recall of judges be advocated on the ground that they have become subservient to