They are readily inclined to believe that specially organized property interests are attempting to make the laws, or to block the making of laws in the interests of property and against the interests of the individual, either singly or in organized groups. Such specially organized property interests have become liable to persistent and sometimes vicious and retaliatory attacks by a majority of the electorate. The fact that this majority is composed of persons who are, to some extent, holders of property does not prevent them from thinking in terms of their position as individuals. Thus spectacular onslaughts by the electorate have been made upon such organized property interests as railroads, public-service corporations, and mine-owners. Legislation to promote social justice and in the actual or pretended exercise of the police power may be in effect an attack upon some legitimate business. Yet the general object of such acts will receive an overwhelming popular approval. Step by step with the development of this antagonism in the state between specially organized property interests and the individual has grown the effort of such interests to combine for protection from the electorate. Naturally they use all the means at their disposal in the governmental scheme to secure that protection. The governor’s veto, however, has proved of less and less value, for the governor is so conspicuous an officer as frequently to be a popular choice. Property interests have fallen back upon the legislative lobby, an alliance with the extra-legal government, and the constant urging of the courts to go farther and farther in the exercise of their veto power over legislation. The lobby has gained power through the assistance and sanction of the leaders of the extra-legal government. That government has been stimulated to the highest efficiency and the greatest activity by reason of the prizes coming to its leaders as the result of their alliance and partnership with collectively organized property interests. As a last resort the courts have again and again been importuned to veto legislation inimical to specially organized property interests, and all property interests when attacked at once become specially organized at the point of attack. These importunities come in the form of arguments to the court on behalf of property interests that are unfavorably affected by the legislation in question. Frequently the act which they complain of has been badly drawn and is really vicious and unfair in some of its workings, although the main principle may be sound. This intensifies the appeal of the individual for its overthrow. Such complaints from the interests affected, together with the social and economic theories of the judges themselves, and no doubt in some cases, the direct influence of the extra-legal government, have been pressed upon the judges in an effort to cause them to abandon the academic, theoretical, and bloodless function which was