summoning the peers into a private chamber, informed the duke of Suffolk, by mouth of his chancellor, that, inasmuch as he had not put himself upon his peerage, but submitted wholly to the royal pleasure, the king, acquitting him of the first articles containing matter of treason, by his own advice and not that of the lords, nor by way of judgment, not being in a place where judgment could be delivered, banished him for five years from his dominions. The lords then present besought the king to let their protest appear on record, that neither they nor their posterity might lose their rights of peerage by this precedent. It was justly considered as an arbitrary stretch of prerogative, in order to defeat the privileges of parliament and screen a favourite minister from punishment. But the course of proceeding by bill of attainder, instead of regular impeachment, was not judiciously chosen by the commons.[232] [Sidenote: Privilege of parliament.] 7. Privilege of parliament, an extensive and singular branch of our constitutional law, begins to attract attention under the Lancastrian princes. It is true indeed that we can trace long before by records, and may infer with probability as to times whose records have not survived, one considerable immunity--a freedom from arrest for persons transacting the king's business in his national council.[233] Several authorities may be found in Mr. Hatsell's Precedents; of which one, in the 9th of Edward II., is conclusive.[234] But in those rude times members of parliament were not always respected by the officers executing legal process, and still less by the violators of law. After several remonstrances, which the crown had evaded,[235] the commons obtained the statute 11 Henry VI. c. 11, for the punishment of such as assault any on their way to the parliament, giving double damages to the party.[236] They had more difficulty in establishing, notwithstanding the old precedents in their favour, an immunity from all criminal process except in charges of treason, felony, and breach of the peace, which is their present measure of privilege. The truth was, that, with a right pretty clearly recognised, as is admitted by the judges in Thorp's case, the house of commons had no regular compulsory process at their command. In the cases of Lark, servant of a member, in the 8th of Henry VI.,[237] and of Clerke, himself a burgess, in the 39th of the same king,[238] it was thought necessary to effect their release from a civil execution by special acts of parliament. The commons, in a former instance, endeavoured to make the law general that no members nor their servants might be taken except for treason, felony, and breach of peace; but the king put a negative upon this part of their petition.